Gitflic MCP Server
gitflic-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_generic_artifact → compare_branches → create_issue. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow download_generic_artifact → compare_branches → create_issue
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "create_webhook"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "create_webhook" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow create_webhook
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "update_webhook"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "update_webhook" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow update_webhook
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "update_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "update_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool update_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Tool "unlink_issue_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "unlink_issue_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool unlink_issue_file
low Mutating tool "unlink_issue_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "unlink_issue_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool unlink_issue_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "filepath" on "list_files"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "list_files" takes a path parameter "filepath" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool list_files · inputSchema.properties.filepath
low Unconstrained path parameter "directory" on "list_files_recursive"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "list_files_recursive" takes a path parameter "directory" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool list_files_recursive · inputSchema.properties.directory
Tools 112
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhooknetwork egressreads sensitive dataupdate_webhooknetwork egressreads sensitive datacompare_branchesreads sensitive datacreate_issuenetwork egresscreate_issue_relationnetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egressdownload_generic_artifactingests untrusted inputget_latest_releaseingests untrusted inputget_releaseingests untrusted inputlist_filesreads sensitive data
Show 102 more tools ↓
list_files_recursivereads sensitive datalist_issue_filesreads sensitive datalist_issuesingests untrusted inputlist_package_filesreads sensitive datalist_package_versionsingests untrusted inputunlink_issue_filewrites filesupdate_releaseingests untrusted inputupload_generic_artifactingests untrusted inputadd_issue_commentno sensitive capabilityapprove_merge_requestno sensitive capabilitycancel_jobno sensitive capabilitycancel_merge_requestno sensitive capabilitycancel_pipelineno sensitive capabilitychange_company_member_roleno sensitive capabilitychange_member_roleno sensitive capabilitychange_team_member_roleno sensitive capabilitychange_team_roleno sensitive capabilityclose_merge_requestno sensitive capabilitycompare_branch_fileno sensitive capabilitycreate_branchno sensitive capabilitycreate_companyno sensitive capabilitycreate_merge_requestno sensitive capabilitycreate_mr_discussionno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitycreate_releaseno sensitive capabilitycreate_tagno sensitive capabilitycreate_teamno sensitive capabilitydelete_branchno sensitive capabilitydelete_issueno sensitive capabilitydelete_issue_commentno sensitive capabilitydelete_issue_relationno sensitive capabilitydelete_mr_discussionno sensitive capabilitydelete_packageno sensitive capabilitydelete_projectno sensitive capabilitydelete_releaseno sensitive capabilitydiff_commitsno sensitive capabilityedit_issue_commentno sensitive capabilityfind_mr_by_commitno sensitive capabilityfork_projectno sensitive capabilityget_branchno sensitive capabilityget_commitno sensitive capabilityget_commit_filesno sensitive capabilityget_companyno sensitive capabilityget_default_branchno sensitive capabilityget_file_contentno sensitive capabilityget_issueno sensitive capabilityget_jobno sensitive capabilityget_meno sensitive capabilityget_merge_requestno sensitive capabilityget_mr_discussionno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_tagno sensitive capabilityget_teamno sensitive capabilityget_userno sensitive capabilityget_webhookno sensitive capabilityinvite_company_memberno sensitive capabilityinvite_project_memberno sensitive capabilityinvite_project_teamno sensitive capabilityinvite_team_memberno sensitive capabilitylink_issue_fileno sensitive capabilitylist_branchesno sensitive capabilitylist_cicd_variablesno sensitive capabilitylist_commitsno sensitive capabilitylist_companiesno sensitive capabilitylist_company_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_issue_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_issue_relationsno sensitive capabilitylist_job_artifactsno sensitive capabilitylist_merge_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_mr_discussionsno sensitive capabilitylist_my_companiesno sensitive capabilitylist_packagesno sensitive capabilitylist_pipeline_jobsno sensitive capabilitylist_pipelinesno sensitive capabilitylist_project_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_project_runnersno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_releasesno sensitive capabilitylist_shared_companiesno sensitive capabilitylist_shared_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_shared_teamsno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilitylist_team_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_teamsno sensitive capabilitylist_user_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitymerge_merge_requestno sensitive capabilityremove_company_memberno sensitive capabilityremove_project_memberno sensitive capabilityremove_project_teamno sensitive capabilityremove_team_memberno sensitive capabilityreply_mr_discussionno sensitive capabilityresolve_mr_discussionno sensitive capabilityrestart_jobno sensitive capabilityrestart_pipelineno sensitive capabilitysearch_projectsno sensitive capabilitysetup_push_mirrorno sensitive capabilitystart_pipelineno sensitive capabilitytrigger_mirror_updateno sensitive capabilityupdate_issueno sensitive capabilityupdate_merge_requestno sensitive capabilityupdate_projectno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 3
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (112 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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