Git (PyPI) MCP Server
git-mcp-server
PyPI
v0.2.5
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Git MCP Server - Unified command-line tool for managing Git repositories across GitHub and GitLab
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (git_mcp/commands/mr.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`git_mcp/commands/mr.py:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: usage result = subprocess.run( # nosec B603, B607 - Safe git command with fixed args ["git", "bran
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server git_mcp/commands/mr.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (git_mcp/mcp_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`git_mcp/mcp_server.py:846`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: xists, then add subprocess.run( ["claude", "mcp", "remove", "git-mcp-server"], capture_o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server git_mcp/mcp_server.py
Tools 33
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_issuenetwork egresscreate_issue_commentnetwork egressclose_issueno sensitive capabilityclose_merge_requestno sensitive capabilityclose_milestoneno sensitive capabilitycreate_forkno sensitive capabilitycreate_merge_requestno sensitive capabilitycreate_milestoneno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitydelete_projectno sensitive capability
Show 23 more tools ↓
get_current_user_infono sensitive capabilityget_fork_infono sensitive capabilityget_issue_by_urlno sensitive capabilityget_issue_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_merge_request_commitsno sensitive capabilityget_merge_request_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_merge_request_diffno sensitive capabilityget_platform_configno sensitive capabilityget_project_detailsno sensitive capabilitylist_all_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_forksno sensitive capabilitylist_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_merge_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_milestonesno sensitive capabilitylist_my_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_my_merge_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_platformsno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilityrefresh_platform_usernameno sensitive capabilitytest_platform_connectionno sensitive capabilityupdate_issueno sensitive capabilityupdate_merge_requestno sensitive capabilityupdate_milestoneno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.5 latest |
A 92/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan git-mcp-server --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Git 16
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 17 side by side →
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