Git (npm) MCP Server
git-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for interacting with Git using natural language
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/programs/command-executor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/programs/command-executor.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t { exec, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); export clas
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/programs/command-executor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/programs/command-executor.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/programs/command-executor.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t { exec, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { CommandResult } from '../types.js';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/programs/command-executor.ts
Tools 36
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
git_fetchingests untrusted inputgit_amendno sensitive capabilitygit_blameno sensitive capabilitygit_checkoutno sensitive capabilitygit_cherry_pickno sensitive capabilitygit_commitno sensitive capabilitygit_create_branchno sensitive capabilitygit_delete_branchno sensitive capabilitygit_diffno sensitive capabilitygit_discard_changesno sensitive capability
Show 26 more tools ↓
git_file_historyno sensitive capabilitygit_find_lostno sensitive capabilitygit_list_branchesno sensitive capabilitygit_logno sensitive capabilitygit_mergeno sensitive capabilitygit_move_changesno sensitive capabilitygit_pullno sensitive capabilitygit_pushno sensitive capabilitygit_rebaseno sensitive capabilitygit_recover_branchno sensitive capabilitygit_recover_commitno sensitive capabilitygit_reflogno sensitive capabilitygit_remoteno sensitive capabilitygit_resetno sensitive capabilitygit_reset_to_reflogno sensitive capabilitygit_revertno sensitive capabilitygit_searchno sensitive capabilitygit_showno sensitive capabilitygit_squashno sensitive capabilitygit_stageno sensitive capabilitygit_stashno sensitive capabilitygit_statusno sensitive capabilitygit_undo_commitno sensitive capabilitygit_undo_mergeno sensitive capabilitygit_unstageno sensitive capabilitygit_update_branchno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (36 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan git-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Git 16
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 17 side by side →
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