Localstack (giovane.martins) MCP Server
@giovane.martins/localstack
npm
v1.1.5
Published by @giovane.martins — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for LocalStack AWS services
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: s3_get_object → secretsmanager_get_secret → ses_send_email. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow s3_get_object → secretsmanager_get_secret → ses_send_email
medium Tool "s3_put_object" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "s3_put_object" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "put_object" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool s3_put_object
low Mutating tool "s3_put_object" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "s3_put_object" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool s3_put_object
Tools 73
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
s3_get_objectingests untrusted inputs3_put_objectwrites filessecretsmanager_get_secretreads sensitive datasecretsmanager_list_secretsreads sensitive datases_send_emailnetwork egresssqs_send_messagenetwork egressdynamodb_create_tableno sensitive capabilitydynamodb_delete_itemno sensitive capabilitydynamodb_delete_tableno sensitive capabilitydynamodb_describe_tableno sensitive capability
Show 63 more tools ↓
dynamodb_get_itemno sensitive capabilitydynamodb_list_tablesno sensitive capabilitydynamodb_put_itemno sensitive capabilitydynamodb_queryno sensitive capabilitydynamodb_scanno sensitive capabilityeventbridge_create_busno sensitive capabilityeventbridge_delete_busno sensitive capabilityeventbridge_delete_ruleno sensitive capabilityeventbridge_describe_ruleno sensitive capabilityeventbridge_disable_ruleno sensitive capabilityeventbridge_enable_ruleno sensitive capabilityeventbridge_list_busesno sensitive capabilityeventbridge_list_rulesno sensitive capabilityeventbridge_list_targetsno sensitive capabilityeventbridge_put_eventsno sensitive capabilityeventbridge_put_ruleno sensitive capabilityeventbridge_put_targetsno sensitive capabilityeventbridge_remove_targetsno sensitive capabilitykinesis_create_streamno sensitive capabilitykinesis_delete_streamno sensitive capabilitykinesis_describe_streamno sensitive capabilitykinesis_get_recordsno sensitive capabilitykinesis_list_streamsno sensitive capabilitykinesis_put_recordno sensitive capabilitykinesis_put_recordsno sensitive capabilitylambda_create_functionno sensitive capabilitylambda_delete_functionno sensitive capabilitylambda_get_functionno sensitive capabilitylambda_invokeno sensitive capabilitylambda_list_functionsno sensitive capabilitys3_create_bucketno sensitive capabilitys3_delete_bucketno sensitive capabilitys3_delete_objectno sensitive capabilitys3_list_bucketsno sensitive capabilitys3_list_objectsno sensitive capabilitysecretsmanager_create_secretno sensitive capabilitysecretsmanager_delete_secretno sensitive capabilitysecretsmanager_describe_secretno sensitive capabilitysecretsmanager_restore_secretno sensitive capabilitysecretsmanager_update_secretno sensitive capabilityses_delete_identityno sensitive capabilityses_get_identity_verification_attributesno sensitive capabilityses_list_identitiesno sensitive capabilityses_verify_email_identityno sensitive capabilitysns_create_topicno sensitive capabilitysns_delete_topicno sensitive capabilitysns_list_subscriptions_by_topicno sensitive capabilitysns_list_topicsno sensitive capabilitysns_publishno sensitive capabilitysns_subscribeno sensitive capabilitysns_unsubscribeno sensitive capabilitysqs_create_queueno sensitive capabilitysqs_delete_messageno sensitive capabilitysqs_delete_queueno sensitive capabilitysqs_list_queuesno sensitive capabilitysqs_purge_queueno sensitive capabilitysqs_receive_messagesno sensitive capabilityssm_delete_parameterno sensitive capabilityssm_delete_parametersno sensitive capabilityssm_describe_parametersno sensitive capabilityssm_get_parameterno sensitive capabilityssm_get_parameters_by_pathno sensitive capabilityssm_put_parameterno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (73 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @giovane.martins/localstack --onlineOther implementations of Localstack 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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