gia-mcp-server
npm
v0.4.4
Published by knowledgepa3 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Runtime governance layer for generative AI agents. Works with any MCP-compatible client — Claude, GPT, Gemini, Cursor, or custom frameworks. MAI classification, forensic audit trails, human-in-the-loop gates, EU AI Act compliance, NIST/SOC 2/CMMC mapping.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 3.6 = 96. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −3.6 | Near-miss of exa-mcp-server MTC-SUP-005 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 96 − 7 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/tools/srt.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec as cpExec } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { MaiC
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/tools/srt.js
"gia-mcp-server" is edit-distance 2 from the package "exa-mcp-server". Verify this is the intended package.
Fix: Confirm you meant "exa-mcp-server". Install packages only from their documented, official name.
Location: package gia-mcp-server
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gia_scan_environmentreads sensitive dataagent_citizenship_statusno sensitive capabilityagent_rightsno sensitive capabilityapprove_gateno sensitive capabilityassess_risk_tierno sensitive capabilityaudit_pipelineno sensitive capabilityboard_approve_gateno sensitive capabilityboard_convene_sessionno sensitive capabilityboard_get_sessionno sensitive capabilityboard_install_kitno sensitive capabilityboard_list_chartersno sensitive capabilityboard_list_institutionsno sensitive capabilityboard_search_precedentno sensitive capabilitybranch_authority_statusno sensitive capabilitychain_of_reasoningno sensitive capabilityclassify_decisionno sensitive capabilitycolony_convene_requestno sensitive capabilitycolony_healthno sensitive capabilitycolony_suggestionno sensitive capabilitycompose_memory_packsno sensitive capabilitycontext_reviveno sensitive capabilitydistill_memory_packno sensitive capabilityevaluate_routing_thresholdno sensitive capabilityevaluate_thresholdno sensitive capabilityexport_ledgerno sensitive capabilitygenerate_impact_reportno sensitive capabilitygenerate_reportno sensitive capabilitygenerate_value_reportno sensitive capabilityget_gate_statusno sensitive capabilitygia_apply_packno sensitive capabilitygia_dry_run_packno sensitive capabilitygia_ingest_documentno sensitive capabilitygia_list_packsno sensitive capabilitygia_retrieveno sensitive capabilitygia_run_patrolno sensitive capabilitygoverned_sampleno sensitive capabilitylist_available_toolsno sensitive capabilityload_memory_packno sensitive capabilitymap_complianceno sensitive capabilitymonitor_agentsno sensitive capabilityphoenix_recovery_healthno sensitive capabilityphoenix_snapshotno sensitive capabilityphoenix_verify_integrityno sensitive capabilitypromote_memory_packno sensitive capabilityrecord_governance_eventno sensitive capabilityrecord_value_metricno sensitive capabilityrequest_contextno sensitive capabilityscore_governanceno sensitive capabilityseal_memory_packno sensitive capabilitysrt_approve_repairno sensitive capabilitysrt_diagnoseno sensitive capabilitysrt_generate_postmortemno sensitive capabilitysrt_run_watchdogno sensitive capabilitysystem_statusno sensitive capabilitytransfer_memory_packno sensitive capabilityverify_ledgerno sensitive capabilityverify_ledger_v2no sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.4 latest |
B 89/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.4.2 |
B 89/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v0.4.1 |
B 89/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan gia-mcp-server --online
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