Raw scan report

Ghostrun Cli — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.8.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "ghostrun-cli",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "ghostrun-cli"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "ghostrun-cli"
    }
  },
  "grade": "D",
  "score": {
    "score": 68,
    "threatScore": 83,
    "grade": "D",
    "band": "D",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 15.4,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 2.1,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
        "category": "injection",
        "severity": "high",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 22,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 15.4
      },
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
        "category": "supply-chain",
        "severity": "low",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 3,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 2.1
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "critical",
        "label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 10
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "none",
        "label": "publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect",
        "appliedPenalty": 5
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "critical",
    "reasons": [
      "ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
      "can execute shell commands or code",
      "untrusted input can reach code execution"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "untrusted-input",
      "code-exec"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": true,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
      "title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (ghostrun.js)",
      "category": "injection",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`ghostrun.js:3888`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "ghostrun.js"
      },
      "evidence": "new Function(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
        "file": "ghostrun.js",
        "line": 3888
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
      "title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (ghostrun.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`ghostrun.js:1947`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "ghostrun.js"
      },
      "evidence": "new Function(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
        "file": "ghostrun.js",
        "line": 1947
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (ghostrun.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`ghostrun.js:5302`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "ghostrun.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "ghostrun.js",
        "line": 5302
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (mcp-server.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp-server.js:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "mcp-server.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "mcp-server.js",
        "line": 30
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/author-benchmark.mjs)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`scripts/author-benchmark.mjs:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "scripts/author-benchmark.mjs"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "scripts/author-benchmark.mjs",
        "line": 10
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
      "title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"scrape_website\"",
      "category": "network",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"scrape_website\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
      "remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "scrape_website",
        "field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
      "data": {
        "param": "url"
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
      "title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"scrape_and_run_flow\"",
      "category": "network",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"scrape_and_run_flow\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
      "remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "scrape_and_run_flow",
        "field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
      "data": {
        "param": "url"
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
      "title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (ghostrun.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`ghostrun.js:1947`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "ghostrun.js"
      },
      "evidence": "import(specifier)",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
        "file": "ghostrun.js",
        "line": 1947
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
      "title": "Package has no source repository",
      "category": "supply-chain",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "\"ghostrun-cli\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
      "remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "ghostrun-cli"
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "tool": "list_flows",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_flow",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "run_flow",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "scrape_website",
      "tags": [
        "untrusted-input"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "untrusted-input": [
          "keyword \"scrape\""
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_scrape_result",
      "tags": [
        "untrusted-input"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "untrusted-input": [
          "keyword \"fetch\""
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "scrape_and_run_flow",
      "tags": [
        "untrusted-input"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "untrusted-input": [
          "keyword \"scrape\""
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_run_result",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list_runs",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "delete_flow",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_status",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list_profiles",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list_suites",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "run_suite",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list_repair_proposals",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_repair_proposal",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_ai_usage",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "author_flow",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    }
  ],
  "surfaceDigest": "9618da0a2a6947c30ac51d831745c299593beac7d52929ea67d05907415fd219",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 17,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 5,
      "medium": 3,
      "low": 1,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}