Ghost In The Droid — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "ghost-in-the-droid",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "ghost-in-the-droid"
},
"server": {
"name": "ghost-in-the-droid"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (66 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (gitd/bots/common/adb.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`gitd/bots/common/adb.py:49`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "gitd/bots/common/adb.py"
},
"evidence": "10) -> bytes: raw = subprocess.check_output([\"adb\", \"-s\", serial, \"exec-out\", \"screencap\", \"-p\"], timeout=timeout)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "gitd/bots/common/adb.py",
"line": 49,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (gitd/bots/common/ios.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`gitd/bots/common/ios.py:657`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "gitd/bots/common/ios.py"
},
"evidence": "try: output = subprocess.check_output([\"ps\", \"-eo\", \"pid=,uid=,command=\"], text=True, timeout=5) except (O",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "gitd/bots/common/ios.py",
"line": 657,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (gitd/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`gitd/cli.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "gitd/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [\"os.system(\", \"eval(\", \"exec(\", \"subprocess.call(\", \"__import__\"] def _fetch_registry() -> list",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "gitd/cli.py",
"line": 29,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (gitd/ghostcli/mcp.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`gitd/ghostcli/mcp.py:99`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "gitd/ghostcli/mcp.py"
},
"evidence": "try: subprocess.run( [\"claude\", \"mcp\", \"add\", SERVER_NAME, \"--\", SERVER_CMD],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "gitd/ghostcli/mcp.py",
"line": 99,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (gitd/mcp_server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`gitd/mcp_server.py:802`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "gitd/mcp_server.py"
},
"evidence": "_skill.py\" result = subprocess.run( [ sys.executable, \"-u\", str(runner),",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "gitd/mcp_server.py",
"line": 802,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (gitd/routers/bot.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`gitd/routers/bot.py:109`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "gitd/routers/bot.py"
},
"evidence": "flush() _bot_proc = subprocess.Popen( _build_cmd(job), stdout=log_f, stderr=subprocess.STDOU",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "gitd/routers/bot.py",
"line": 109,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (gitd/routers/creator.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`gitd/routers/creator.py:197`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "gitd/routers/creator.py"
},
"evidence": "ge}\" proc = subprocess.run( [ \"claude\", \"--print\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "gitd/routers/creator.py",
"line": 197,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (gitd/routers/explorer.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`gitd/routers/explorer.py:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "gitd/routers/explorer.py"
},
"evidence": "_file, \"w\") proc = _subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=log_f, stderr=_subprocess.STDOUT, cwd=str(_PROJECT_DIR)) _activ",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "gitd/routers/explorer.py",
"line": 70,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (gitd/routers/phone.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`gitd/routers/phone.py:61`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "gitd/routers/phone.py"
},
"evidence": "d serials out = subprocess.check_output([\"adb\", \"devices\"], timeout=3).decode() connected = {line.split(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "gitd/routers/phone.py",
"line": 61,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (gitd/tools/tts.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`gitd/tools/tts.py:19`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "gitd/tools/tts.py"
},
"evidence": "as fallback resp = requests.post( \"https://ttsvibes.com/?/generate\", headers={ \"accept\"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "gitd/tools/tts.py",
"line": 19,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (gitd/benchmarks/ghost_bench/evaluators.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`gitd/benchmarks/ghost_bench/evaluators.py:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "gitd/benchmarks/ghost_bench/evaluators.py"
},
"evidence": "\"shell\", *args] r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout) return r.stdout.strip()",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "gitd/benchmarks/ghost_bench/evaluators.py",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_devices",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_elements",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tap",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tap_element",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "swipe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "type_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "type_unicode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "press_back",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "press_home",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "press_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "launch_app",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "force_stop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "app_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "open_camera",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "speak_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_apps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_apps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_packages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "long_press",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_phone_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "device_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fix_device_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_screen_tree",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_screen_xml",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "screenshot_annotated",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "screenshot_cropped",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "start_screen_recording",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stop_screen_recording",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "screen_recording_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_stream_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ocr_screen",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ocr_region",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "classify_screen",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "toggle_overlay",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clipboard_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clipboard_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "paste_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_notifications",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "open_notifications",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clear_notifications",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "web_search",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"web_search\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "open_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_back",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_current_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wait_for_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_visible_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_articles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_news",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "launch_intent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_on_screen",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_skills",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_action",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_flow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_crashes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_crash",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wait",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "explore_app",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_skill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "draft_skill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_skill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lookup_lead",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_unread_leads",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_lookup_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crm_list_unread_messages",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_message\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "03aac4050c5002c071a06eefc7754da7f453a6edd25f6087b8cd0e5bf9f35d06",
"stats": {
"tools": 66,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 9,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}