Cli MCP Server
@getmcpm/cli
npm
v0.23.0
Source verified
Published by getmcpm — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −22 | Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
Grade capped: 1 confirmed high finding → grade capped at C. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
Findings 9
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/chunk-YLAJ4ZQJ.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-YLAJ4ZQJ.js:34`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: id_rsa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-YLAJ4ZQJ.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/cli-DMT5JHW2.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli-DMT5JHW2.js:256`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .config/gcloud
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli-DMT5JHW2.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/runner-IFTP6JT5.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/runner-IFTP6JT5.js:23`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ~/.ssh
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/runner-IFTP6JT5.js
high Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (dist/chunk-YLAJ4ZQJ.js)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `dist/chunk-YLAJ4ZQJ.js:201`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server dist/chunk-YLAJ4ZQJ.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-26D75IWZ.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-26D75IWZ.js:150`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-26D75IWZ.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-GZ3WCRLG.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-GZ3WCRLG.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-GZ3WCRLG.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-SN3RQIVF.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-SN3RQIVF.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-SN3RQIVF.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2696`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn (
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/run-inner-OCPVZX44.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/run-inner-OCPVZX44.js:124`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/run-inner-OCPVZX44.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.23.0 latest |
C 78/100 | 9 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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