Gemini Cli (epicsagas) MCP Server
gemini-cli-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.4
Published by epicsagas — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP Server for Gemini CLI integration with Cursor, Claude Desktop, and other agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: l/sdk/types.js"); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const dotenv_1 = require("dotenv"); const commander_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"gemini-cli-mcp-server" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: echo 'Run npm run install-gemini to install Gemini CLI if needed'
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package gemini-cli-mcp-server
Tools 14
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gemini_apply_suggestionno sensitive capabilitygemini_ask_questionno sensitive capabilitygemini_code_reviewno sensitive capabilitygemini_consultno sensitive capabilitygemini_document_codeno sensitive capabilitygemini_explain_codeno sensitive capabilitygemini_generate_testsno sensitive capabilitygemini_git_commit_push_prno sensitive capabilitygemini_refactor_codeno sensitive capabilitygemini_run_buildno sensitive capability
Show 4 more tools ↓
gemini_run_testsno sensitive capabilitygemini_statusno sensitive capabilitygemini_translateno sensitive capabilitytoggle_gemini_auto_consultno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (14 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.4 latest |
A 92/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan gemini-cli-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Gemini Cli 7
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 8 side by side →
[DEPRECATED] No longer maintained — Gemini CLI stops serving its free/Pro/Ultra tiers on 2026-06-18 (Google is moving to Antigravity CLI). Safe MCP server wrapping the official Gemini CLI.
MCP server wrapper for Google's Gemini CLI
MCP server wrapper for Google's Gemini CLI
MCP server that delegates prompt execution to a locally installed Gemini CLI
Secure MCP server wrapping Google Gemini CLI — cross-platform, activity-based timeout, minimal token overhead
MCP server that exposes Gemini CLI as a single tool for Claude Code
More in AI & Agents
Authenticated MCP transport with HTTP Signatures for AAuth agents
Local-first MCP server for parallel AI coding agents to claim file ownership before edits, preventing stomping on each other in the same worktree.
Agent-agnostic intercommunication system — sessions, messaging, channels, shared state, and real-time events
MCP server for AI agent task communication and delegation with diagnostic lifecycle visibility
Programmatic add/link/unlink for MCP servers across 23 AI coding agents (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Zed, Cline, OpenCode, Goose, Kiro, Windsurf, and more). Functional API with dry-run support.
MCP server layer exposing agent-mesh orchestrator as an MCP agent