Gemini Cli Bridge — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "gemini-cli-bridge",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "gemini-cli-bridge"
},
"server": {
"name": "gemini-cli-bridge"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 88,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"sensitive-source",
"file-write"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: WebFetch → ReadFile → Shell. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "WebFetch → ReadFile → Shell"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"gemini_web_fetch",
"WebFetch"
],
"sources": [
"ReadFile"
],
"sinks": [
"Shell"
],
"path": [
"WebFetch",
"ReadFile",
"Shell"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "WebFetch",
"to": "ReadFile",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "ReadFile",
"to": "Shell",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"Shell\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"Shell\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"shell\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "Shell"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (gemini_cli_bridge.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`gemini_cli_bridge.py:160`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "gemini_cli_bridge.py"
},
"evidence": "default=120) proc = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=to,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "gemini_cli_bridge.py",
"line": 160,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"WriteFile\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"WriteFile\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"writefile\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "WriteFile"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"Shell\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"Shell\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "Shell"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"WriteFile\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"WriteFile\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "WriteFile"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"gemini-cli-bridge\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "gemini-cli-bridge"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"gemini_web_fetch",
"WebFetch"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"ReadFile"
],
"externalSink": [
"Shell"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"WebFetch",
"ReadFile",
"Shell"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: WebFetch → ReadFile → Shell."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "gemini_version",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gemini_mcp_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gemini_mcp_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gemini_mcp_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gemini_web_fetch",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gemini_extensions_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gemini_prompt_plus",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gemini_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gemini_prompt_with_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Shell",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"shell\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "FindFiles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ReadFile",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"readfile\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ReadFolder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ReadManyFiles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "SaveMemory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "SearchText",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "WriteFile",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"writefile\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "Edit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "WebFetch",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "GoogleSearch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "GeminiGoogleSearch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "39e2b5340ea3d299dd7e740ffeda956911f8dc6f7d586346c144b23dcd6e4962",
"stats": {
"tools": 21,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 2,
"medium": 1,
"low": 2,
"info": 1
}
}
}