Gdpr Shift Left MCP Server
gdpr-shift-left-mcp
PyPI
v0.4.0
Published by kevinrabun — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
GDPR Shift-Left Compliance MCP Server — Azure-first GDPR guidance, code review, and audit tools
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_enhanced_analyzers.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_enhanced_analyzers.py:238`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://sheets.google.com/api/v4/spreadsheets'); return response.json();
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_enhanced_analyzers.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/evaluator/checks_adversarial.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/evaluator/checks_adversarial.py:2730`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ("eval_bypass", "new Function('return this.email')(); const password = 'x';"), # Comment bypass attempts
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/evaluator/checks_adversarial.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/evaluator/checks_adversarial.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/evaluator/checks_adversarial.py:2674`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ("exec_injection", "exec('import os; os.system(\"rm -rf /\")'); def get_email(): pass"), ("eval_injection",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/evaluator/checks_adversarial.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_bicep_templates.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_bicep_templates.py:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( "az bicep version", capture_output=True, text=True, time
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_bicep_templates.py
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_code_for_role_indicatorsnetwork egressanalyze_application_codeno sensitive capabilityanalyze_breach_readinessno sensitive capabilityanalyze_code_astno sensitive capabilityanalyze_cross_border_transfersno sensitive capabilityanalyze_data_flowno sensitive capabilityanalyze_dsr_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilityanalyze_infrastructure_codeno sensitive capabilityassess_controller_processor_roleno sensitive capabilityassess_dpia_needno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
assess_retention_policyno sensitive capabilitycheck_deletion_requirementsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_dpa_checklistno sensitive capabilitygenerate_dpia_templateno sensitive capabilitygenerate_dsr_workflowno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ropa_templateno sensitive capabilityget_articleno sensitive capabilityget_ast_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilityget_azure_mappingno sensitive capabilityget_definitionno sensitive capabilityget_dpia_guidanceno sensitive capabilityget_dsr_guidanceno sensitive capabilityget_dsr_timelineno sensitive capabilityget_recitalno sensitive capabilityget_retention_guidanceno sensitive capabilityget_role_obligationsno sensitive capabilityget_role_scenariosno sensitive capabilityget_ropa_requirementsno sensitive capabilitylist_chapter_articlesno sensitive capabilitylist_definitionsno sensitive capabilitysearch_definitionsno sensitive capabilitysearch_gdprno sensitive capabilityvalidate_gdpr_configno sensitive capabilityvalidate_ropano sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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