Gcontext MCP Server
gcontext-mcp
PyPI
v0.3.3
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
gcontext connector — local MCP bridge: cloud structure, local secret values
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 3.6 = 96. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −3.6 | Near-miss of @upstash/context7-mcp MTC-SUP-005 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 96 − 8 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([tool_read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([tool_run_script, tool_run_shell]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [tool_read_file] → sinks [tool_run_script, tool_run_shell]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow tool_read_file → tool_run_script
high Tool "tool_run_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "tool_run_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_script" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool tool_run_script
high Tool "tool_run_shell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "tool_run_shell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool tool_run_shell
high Shell/command execution in server code (server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`server.py:179`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _sec(*args): return subprocess.run([_SECURITY, *args], capture_output=True, text=True) def _sec_read(name): """
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server.py
medium Tool "tool_write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "tool_write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool tool_write_file
medium Near-miss of @upstash/context7-mcp (edit distance 2)MTC-SUP-005
"gcontext-mcp" is edit-distance 2 from the high-traffic package "@upstash/context7-mcp". Verify this is the intended package.
Fix: Confirm you meant "@upstash/context7-mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.
Location: package gcontext-mcp
low Mutating tool "tool_write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "tool_write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool tool_write_file
low Mutating tool "tool_run_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "tool_run_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool tool_run_script
low Mutating tool "tool_run_shell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "tool_run_shell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool tool_run_shell
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_journey.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_journey.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ON_SECRET": ""} cloud = subprocess.Popen(["uv", "run", "--group", "dev", "python", "cloud_api.py"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_journey.py
Tools 12
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
tool_read_filereads sensitive datatool_run_scriptruns code / shelltool_run_shellruns code / shelltool_write_filewrites filestool_deleteno sensitive capabilitytool_globno sensitive capabilitytool_grepno sensitive capabilitytool_list_dirno sensitive capabilitytool_overviewno sensitive capabilitytool_read_manyno sensitive capability
Show 2 more tools ↓
tool_secretsno sensitive capabilitytool_setup_secretsno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (12 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.3 latest |
B 88/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan gcontext-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Security & Testing
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