Proxygate MCP Server
https://gateway.proxygate.ai/mcp
Remote
v1
Published by gateway.proxygate.ai — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
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The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 3 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([browse_apis, get_pricing, call_api, describe_endpoint]) co-exist with external-action tools ([browse_apis, call_api]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [browse_apis, get_pricing, call_api, describe_endpoint] → sinks [browse_apis, call_api]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow browse_apis → browse_apis
Tools 7
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
browse_apisingests untrusted inputnetwork egresscall_apiingests untrusted inputnetwork egressdescribe_endpointingests untrusted inputget_pricingingests untrusted inputcheck_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_usageno sensitive capabilityrate_sellerno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1 latest |
A 97/100 | 1 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan https://gateway.proxygate.ai/mcp --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
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