Gate402 MCP Server
gate402-mcp
npm
v0.8.0
Published by pgalyen1987 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Gate402 — pay-per-call agent APIs over x402: GPU/CPU compute, open-model LLM inference, crypto/finance data, and web tools. Free tier, no signup.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Tool "gate402_compute" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "gate402_compute" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "cmd"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool gate402_compute
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([gate402_scrape, gate402_scrape_stealth, gate402_html_to_md, gate402_market_infer, gate402_providers]) co-exist with external-action tools ([gate402_compute]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [gate402_scrape, gate402_scrape_stealth, gate402_html_to_md, gate402_market_infer, gate402_providers] → sinks [gate402_compute]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow gate402_scrape → gate402_compute
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "gate402_scrape"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "gate402_scrape" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool gate402_scrape · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "gate402_scrape_stealth"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "gate402_scrape_stealth" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool gate402_scrape_stealth · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained command parameter "cmd" on "gate402_compute"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "gate402_compute" takes a command-shaped parameter "cmd" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool gate402_compute · inputSchema.properties.cmd
low Mutating tool "gate402_compute" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "gate402_compute" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool gate402_compute
Tools 20
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gate402_computeruns code / shellgate402_html_to_mdingests untrusted inputgate402_market_inferingests untrusted inputgate402_providersingests untrusted inputgate402_scrapeingests untrusted inputgate402_scrape_stealthingests untrusted inputgate402_become_providerno sensitive capabilitygate402_best_swapno sensitive capabilitygate402_dedupno sensitive capabilitygate402_dexno sensitive capability
Show 10 more tools ↓
gate402_edgarno sensitive capabilitygate402_inferno sensitive capabilitygate402_json_repairno sensitive capabilitygate402_launchesno sensitive capabilitygate402_minifyno sensitive capabilitygate402_momentumno sensitive capabilitygate402_newsno sensitive capabilitygate402_onchainno sensitive capabilitygate402_token_countno sensitive capabilitygate402_token_riskno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.8.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.7.1 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-02 |
v0.6.0 |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
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