@gabz-araujo/taskwarrior-mcp
npm
v0.1.1
Source verified
Published by gabz-araujo — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Taskwarrior, with optional Timewarrior time reporting.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: leCallback } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const execFile = promisify(execFileCallba
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/taskwarrior/client.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: leCallback } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { z } from "zod"; import { buildLi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/taskwarrior/client.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/timewarrior/client.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: leCallback } from "node:child_process"; import { RawIntervalArraySchema, } from "./types.js"; import { parseTimewTimesta
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/timewarrior/client.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_taskingests untrusted inputadd_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityadd_taskno sensitive capabilityannotate_taskno sensitive capabilitycomplete_taskno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitydelete_taskno sensitive capabilitydenotate_taskno sensitive capabilityget_time_summaryno sensitive capabilitylist_tasksno sensitive capabilitymodify_taskno sensitive capabilitynext_actionno sensitive capabilityremove_dependenciesno sensitive capabilitystart_taskno sensitive capabilitystop_taskno sensitive capabilitywhats_nextno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @gabz-araujo/taskwarrior-mcp --online
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