Filesystem (gabrielmaialva33) MCP Server
@gabrielmaialva33/mcp-filesystem
npm
v1.6.1
Published by @gabrielmaialva33 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Provides secure filesystem access to MCP clients.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 19
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([execute_command, bash_execute, bash_pipe, curl_request]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [read_file] → sinks [execute_command, bash_execute, bash_pipe, curl_request]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow read_file → execute_command
high Tool "execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_command
high Tool "bash_execute" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "bash_execute" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "bash" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool bash_execute
high Tool "bash_pipe" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "bash_pipe" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "bash" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool bash_pipe
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/bash/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/bash/index.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { z } from 'zod'; import { logger
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/bash/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/utils/bash/bash_tools.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/utils/bash/bash_tools.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { z } from 'zod'; import { logger
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/utils/bash/bash_tools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/utils/bash/command_executor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/utils/bash/command_executor.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { logger } from '../../logger/inde
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/utils/bash/command_executor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/utils/bash/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/utils/bash/index.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { logger } from '../../logger/inde
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/utils/bash/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/utils/codebase/project_detector.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/utils/codebase/project_detector.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs'; import path from 'node:path'; promisify(exec); export
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/utils/codebase/project_detector.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/utils/exec/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/utils/exec/index.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecCallback } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { z } from 'zod'; import { FileSys
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/utils/exec/index.js
medium Tool "write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool write_file
medium Tool "edit_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "edit_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "edit_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool edit_file
medium Tool "move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool move_file
low Mutating tool "write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool write_file
low Mutating tool "edit_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "edit_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool edit_file
low Mutating tool "move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool move_file
low Mutating tool "execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_command
low Mutating tool "bash_execute" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "bash_execute" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool bash_execute
low Mutating tool "bash_pipe" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "bash_pipe" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool bash_pipe
Tools 16
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
bash_executeruns code / shellbash_piperuns code / shellcurl_requestnetwork egressedit_filewrites filesexecute_commandruns code / shellmove_filewrites filesread_filereads sensitive datawrite_filewrites filescreate_directoryno sensitive capabilitydirectory_treeno sensitive capability
Show 6 more tools ↓
get_file_infono sensitive capabilityget_metricsno sensitive capabilitylist_allowed_directoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_directoryno sensitive capabilityread_multiple_filesno sensitive capabilitysearch_filesno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.6.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 19 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @gabrielmaialva33/mcp-filesystem --onlineOther implementations of Filesystem 22
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 23 side by side →
MCP server for filesystem operations (view, create, edit files)
Safe sandboxed file read and write tools for local workflows.
General-purpose filesystem server from SylphLab.
The official MCP filesystem server: read, write, search and manage local files with configurable access roots.
Secure filesystem server for reading, writing, searching, diffing, and patching files.
MCP server for filesystem access
More in Files & Storage
Safe bulk Meta ads: launch 150+ campaigns from Drive folders with spend guardrails and validation.
CLI tool to add MCP servers to various AI coding clients
MCP compatibility adapter for Agent Tool Protocol
MCP server for multi-tenant DuckDB management with R2/S3 storage
A stdio-to-HTTP MCP proxy that transparently intercepts file parameters, reading local files and base64-encoding them before forwarding to the remote server.
Free buyer-side outcome verification and provider comparison for supplied agent receipts.