G MCP Server
g-mcp-server
npm
v0.1.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 5.4 = 95. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −5.4 | Near-miss of @sentry/mcp-server ×2 MTC-SUP-005 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 95 − 8 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/daemon-client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/daemon-client.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { dirname, join } from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/daemon-client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFile, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { Readable } from 'stream'; import { cr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile); con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/screen-recorder.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/screen-recorder.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t { spawn, exec } from 'child_process'; import os from 'os'; import fs from 'fs'; import { join } from 'path'; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/screen-recorder.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2770`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tup-agent.mjs'; import(setupPath).catch((err) => { console.error('Failed to run setup wizard:', err)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Near-miss of @sentry/mcp-server (edit distance 2)MTC-SUP-005
"g-mcp-server" is edit-distance 2 from the high-traffic package "@sentry/mcp-server". Verify this is the intended package.
Fix: Confirm you meant "@sentry/mcp-server". Install packages only from their documented, official name.
Location: package g-mcp-server
medium Near-miss of @heroku/mcp-server (edit distance 2)MTC-SUP-005
"g-mcp-server" is edit-distance 2 from the package "@heroku/mcp-server". Verify this is the intended package.
Fix: Confirm you meant "@heroku/mcp-server". Install packages only from their documented, official name.
Location: package g-mcp-server
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/call-tool.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/call-tool.mjs:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { Client } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js'; import { Std
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/call-tool.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/probe-runtime-tools.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/probe-runtime-tools.mjs:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { join, dirname } from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/probe-runtime-tools.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/runtime-quick.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/runtime-quick.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { writeFileSync } from 'fs'; import { join, dirname } from 'path'; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/runtime-quick.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/runtime-session.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/runtime-session.mjs:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { writeFileSync } from 'fs'; import { join, dirname } from 'path'; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/runtime-session.mjs
Tools 4
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
call_godot_mcp_toolno sensitive capabilityget_godot_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_godot_mcp_group_toolsno sensitive capabilitylist_godot_mcp_tool_groupsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (4 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
B 87/100 | 11 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan g-mcp-server --onlineMore in Gaming & Entertainment
Security scan results for the Aether MCP server.
Security scan results for the Bedbook MCP server.
Security scan results for the Claudinho MCP server.
Security scan results for the Cpu Game MCP server.
Security scan results for the Dfhack MCP server.
Security scan results for the Endfield MCP server.