G MCP Server
g-mcp-server
npm
v0.1.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
G-MCP: standalone MCP server for Godot 4.x game engine integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 5.4 = 95. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −5.4 | Near-miss of @sentry/mcp-server ×2 MTC-SUP-005 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 95 − 8 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/daemon-client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/daemon-client.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { dirname, join } from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/daemon-client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFile, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { Readable } from 'stream'; import { cr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile); con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/screen-recorder.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/screen-recorder.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t { spawn, exec } from 'child_process'; import os from 'os'; import fs from 'fs'; import { join } from 'path'; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/screen-recorder.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2770`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tup-agent.mjs'; import(setupPath).catch((err) => { console.error('Failed to run setup wizard:', err)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Near-miss of @sentry/mcp-server (edit distance 2)MTC-SUP-005
"g-mcp-server" is edit-distance 2 from the high-traffic package "@sentry/mcp-server". Verify this is the intended package.
Fix: Confirm you meant "@sentry/mcp-server". Install packages only from their documented, official name.
Location: package g-mcp-server
medium Near-miss of @heroku/mcp-server (edit distance 2)MTC-SUP-005
"g-mcp-server" is edit-distance 2 from the package "@heroku/mcp-server". Verify this is the intended package.
Fix: Confirm you meant "@heroku/mcp-server". Install packages only from their documented, official name.
Location: package g-mcp-server
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/call-tool.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/call-tool.mjs:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { Client } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js'; import { Std
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/call-tool.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/probe-runtime-tools.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/probe-runtime-tools.mjs:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { join, dirname } from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/probe-runtime-tools.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/runtime-quick.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/runtime-quick.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { writeFileSync } from 'fs'; import { join, dirname } from 'path'; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/runtime-quick.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/runtime-session.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/runtime-session.mjs:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { writeFileSync } from 'fs'; import { join, dirname } from 'path'; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/runtime-session.mjs
Tools 4
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
call_godot_mcp_toolno sensitive capabilityget_godot_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_godot_mcp_group_toolsno sensitive capabilitylist_godot_mcp_tool_groupsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (4 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
B 87/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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