Fxhoudinimcp MCP Server
fxhoudinimcp
PyPI
v2.10.0
Published by healkeiser — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Comprehensive MCP server for SideFX Houdini with 179 tools covering SOPs, LOPs/USD, DOPs, PDG/TOPs, COPs, HDAs, animation, rendering, VEX, and more
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (python/fxhoudinimcp/install.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`python/fxhoudinimcp/install.py:255`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["claude", "mcp", "get", SERVER_NAME], capture_output=True, text=Tru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server python/fxhoudinimcp/install.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (python/fxhoudinimcp/uninstall.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`python/fxhoudinimcp/uninstall.py:163`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ntable}"] result = subprocess.run(argv, capture_output=True, text=True) if result.returncode == 0: retu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server python/fxhoudinimcp/uninstall.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (houdini/scripts/python/fxhoudinimcp_server/handlers/code_handlers.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`houdini/scripts/python/fxhoudinimcp_server/handlers/code_handlers.py:104`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = eval(return_expression, namespace) # noqa: S307 except Exception: eval_erro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server houdini/scripts/python/fxhoudinimcp_server/handlers/code_handlers.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_menu.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_menu.py:107`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tartup try: exec(compile(code, item_id, "exec"), {}) finally: for name, module in saved.items():
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_menu.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (houdini/scripts/python/fxhoudinimcp_server/handlers/code_handlers.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`houdini/scripts/python/fxhoudinimcp_server/handlers/code_handlers.py:59`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e code is executed via `exec()` in a namespace that has `hou` pre-imported. If *return_expression* is given it is e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server houdini/scripts/python/fxhoudinimcp_server/handlers/code_handlers.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (houdini/scripts/python/fxhoudinimcp_server/handlers/shelf_handlers.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`houdini/scripts/python/fxhoudinimcp_server/handlers/shelf_handlers.py:215`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : hou} try: exec(script, namespace) # noqa: S102 - running SideFX's own tool script except AttributeErr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server houdini/scripts/python/fxhoudinimcp_server/handlers/shelf_handlers.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/integration/bridge_e2e.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/integration/bridge_e2e.py:103`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: str(port) server = subprocess.Popen( [str(hython), "-c", _SERVER_SNIPPET.format(scripts=scripts)],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/integration/bridge_e2e.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/run_integration.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/run_integration.py:183`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: v[1:], ] return subprocess.call(command, env=env, cwd=str(REPO_ROOT)) if __name__ == "__main__": sys.exit(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/run_integration.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_menu.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_menu.py:107`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tartup try: exec(compile(code, item_id, "exec"), {}) finally: for name, module in saved.items():
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_menu.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/gen_node_versions.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/gen_node_versions.py:124`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ry: completed = subprocess.run( [str(hython), str(_DUMPER)], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/gen_node_versions.py
Tools 188
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_env_variablereads sensitive dataget_help_pageingests untrusted inputassign_materialno sensitive capabilitybuild_networkno sensitive capabilitybuild_sop_chainno sensitive capabilitycancel_top_cookno sensitive capabilitycapture_network_editorno sensitive capabilitycapture_screenshotno sensitive capabilityclear_cacheno sensitive capabilitycompare_snapshotsno sensitive capability
Show 178 more tools ↓
connect_nodesno sensitive capabilityconnect_nodes_batchno sensitive capabilitycook_frame_rangeno sensitive capabilitycook_top_nodeno sensitive capabilitycopy_nodeno sensitive capabilitycreate_chop_nodeno sensitive capabilitycreate_cop_nodeno sensitive capabilitycreate_hdano sensitive capabilitycreate_lightno sensitive capabilitycreate_light_rigno sensitive capabilitycreate_lop_nodeno sensitive capabilitycreate_materialno sensitive capabilitycreate_material_networkno sensitive capabilitycreate_nodeno sensitive capabilitycreate_render_nodeno sensitive capabilitycreate_spare_parameterno sensitive capabilitycreate_spare_parametersno sensitive capabilitycreate_takeno sensitive capabilitycreate_vex_expressionno sensitive capabilitycreate_wrangleno sensitive capabilitydelete_keyframeno sensitive capabilitydelete_nodeno sensitive capabilitydirty_work_itemsno sensitive capabilitydisconnect_nodeno sensitive capabilityevaluate_expressionno sensitive capabilityexecute_hscriptno sensitive capabilityexecute_pythonno sensitive capabilityexplain_nodeno sensitive capabilityexport_chop_to_parmno sensitive capabilityexport_fileno sensitive capabilityfind_error_nodesno sensitive capabilityfind_expensive_nodesno sensitive capabilityfind_nearest_pointno sensitive capabilityfind_nodesno sensitive capabilityfind_usd_primsno sensitive capabilityframe_allno sensitive capabilityframe_selectionno sensitive capabilitygenerate_static_itemsno sensitive capabilityget_attrib_statsno sensitive capabilityget_attrib_valuesno sensitive capabilityget_attribute_infono sensitive capabilityget_bounding_boxno sensitive capabilityget_cache_statusno sensitive capabilityget_chop_datano sensitive capabilityget_context_infono sensitive capabilityget_cook_chainno sensitive capabilityget_cook_statusno sensitive capabilityget_cop_geometryno sensitive capabilityget_cop_infono sensitive capabilityget_cop_layerno sensitive capabilityget_cop_vdbno sensitive capabilityget_current_takeno sensitive capabilityget_dop_fieldno sensitive capabilityget_dop_objectno sensitive capabilityget_dop_relationshipsno sensitive capabilityget_expressionno sensitive capabilityget_frameno sensitive capabilityget_geometry_infono sensitive capabilityget_group_membersno sensitive capabilityget_groupsno sensitive capabilityget_hda_infono sensitive capabilityget_hda_section_contentno sensitive capabilityget_hda_sectionsno sensitive capabilityget_houdini_connection_statusno sensitive capabilityget_keyframesno sensitive capabilityget_last_modified_primsno sensitive capabilityget_material_infono sensitive capabilityget_network_overviewno sensitive capabilityget_node_cardno sensitive capabilityget_node_errors_detailedno sensitive capabilityget_node_infono sensitive capabilityget_parameterno sensitive capabilityget_parameter_schemano sensitive capabilityget_parametersno sensitive capabilityget_pdg_graphno sensitive capabilityget_pointsno sensitive capabilityget_prim_intrinsicsno sensitive capabilityget_primsno sensitive capabilityget_render_progressno sensitive capabilityget_render_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_scene_infono sensitive capabilityget_scene_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_selectionno sensitive capabilityget_shelf_tool_scriptno sensitive capabilityget_sim_memory_usageno sensitive capabilityget_simulation_infono sensitive capabilityget_stage_infono sensitive capabilityget_top_network_infono sensitive capabilityget_top_scheduler_infono sensitive capabilityget_usd_attributeno sensitive capabilityget_usd_compositionno sensitive capabilityget_usd_layersno sensitive capabilityget_usd_materialsno sensitive capabilityget_usd_primno sensitive capabilityget_usd_prim_statsno sensitive capabilityget_usd_variantsno sensitive capabilityget_viewport_infono sensitive capabilityget_volume_infono sensitive capabilityget_work_item_infono sensitive capabilityget_work_item_statesno sensitive capabilityget_wrangle_codeno sensitive capabilityimport_fileno sensitive capabilityinspect_usd_layerno sensitive capabilityinstall_hdano sensitive capabilitylayout_childrenno sensitive capabilitylink_parametersno sensitive capabilitylist_cachesno sensitive capabilitylist_childrenno sensitive capabilitylist_chop_channelsno sensitive capabilitylist_cop_node_typesno sensitive capabilitylist_dop_objectsno sensitive capabilitylist_installed_hdasno sensitive capabilitylist_lightsno sensitive capabilitylist_material_typesno sensitive capabilitylist_materialsno sensitive capabilitylist_node_typesno sensitive capabilitylist_panesno sensitive capabilitylist_render_nodesno sensitive capabilitylist_shelf_toolsno sensitive capabilitylist_takesno sensitive capabilitylist_usd_primsno sensitive capabilityload_sceneno sensitive capabilitylock_parameterno sensitive capabilitylog_statusno sensitive capabilitymove_nodeno sensitive capabilitynew_sceneno sensitive capabilitypause_top_cookno sensitive capabilityplaybar_controlno sensitive capabilityreload_hdano sensitive capabilityrename_nodeno sensitive capabilityrender_node_networkno sensitive capabilityrender_quad_viewno sensitive capabilityrender_viewportno sensitive capabilityreorder_inputsno sensitive capabilityreset_simulationno sensitive capabilityrevert_parameterno sensitive capabilityrun_shelf_toolno sensitive capabilitysample_geometryno sensitive capabilitysave_sceneno sensitive capabilitysearch_helpno sensitive capabilityset_cop_flagsno sensitive capabilityset_current_networkno sensitive capabilityset_current_takeno sensitive capabilityset_detail_attribno sensitive capabilityset_expressionno sensitive capabilityset_frameno sensitive capabilityset_frame_rangeno sensitive capabilityset_hda_section_contentno sensitive capabilityset_keyframeno sensitive capabilityset_keyframesno sensitive capabilityset_light_propertiesno sensitive capabilityset_node_colorno sensitive capabilityset_node_flagsno sensitive capabilityset_node_positionno sensitive capabilityset_parameterno sensitive capabilityset_parametersno sensitive capabilityset_playback_rangeno sensitive capabilityset_render_settingsno sensitive capabilityset_selectionno sensitive capabilityset_usd_attributeno sensitive capabilityset_viewer_contextno sensitive capabilityset_viewport_camerano sensitive capabilityset_viewport_directionno sensitive capabilityset_viewport_displayno sensitive capabilityset_viewport_rendererno sensitive capabilityset_wrangle_codeno sensitive capabilitysetup_flip_simno sensitive capabilitysetup_pyro_simno sensitive capabilitysetup_rbd_simno sensitive capabilitysetup_renderno sensitive capabilitysetup_vellum_simno sensitive capabilitystart_renderno sensitive capabilitystep_simulationno sensitive capabilityuninstall_hdano sensitive capabilityupdate_hdano sensitive capabilityvalidate_vexno sensitive capabilityverify_networkno sensitive capabilitywrite_cacheno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (188 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.10.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v2.6.2 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v2.4.0 |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
v2.1.0 |
A 96/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v1.3.0 |
A 96/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan fxhoudinimcp --online --registry pypiMore in Productivity & Workflow
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