Browser (fusengine) MCP Server
@fusengine/browser-mcp
npm
v0.1.64
Source verified
Published by fusengine — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server + CLI giving AI agents a real, stealth browser (Patchright/Playwright) — per-country identity, self-healing actions, snapshots, multi-step plans, structured extraction, CDP attach.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/engine/cdp-launch.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/cdp-launch.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { logger } from "../lib/logger.js"; /** * Spawn a browser binary with re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engine/cdp-launch.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/live/open-url.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/live/open-url.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; /** Spawn the platform opener for `url`, detached; failures are ignored. */ expo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/live/open-url.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/state/action-memory.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/state/action-memory.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: f (!dir) return exec(action); const url = page.url(); const remembered = rememberedAction(loadSiteMemory
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/state/action-memory.js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "browser_crawl"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "browser_crawl" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool browser_crawl · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "browser_fetch"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "browser_fetch" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool browser_fetch · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "browser_site_shots"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "browser_site_shots" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool browser_site_shots · inputSchema.properties.url
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/postinstall.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/postinstall.mjs:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; const skip = process.env.PLAYWRIGHT_SKIP_BROWSER_DOWNLOAD || process.env.FUSE
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/postinstall.mjs
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@fusengine/browser-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.mjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @fusengine/browser-mcp
Tools 41
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browser_collect_batchingests untrusted inputbrowser_crawlingests untrusted inputbrowser_fetchingests untrusted inputbrowser_fetch_batchingests untrusted inputbrowser_shots_batchingests untrusted inputbrowser_site_shotsingests untrusted inputbrowser_actno sensitive capabilitybrowser_autoscrollno sensitive capabilitybrowser_clipboardno sensitive capabilitybrowser_closeno sensitive capability
Show 31 more tools ↓
browser_collectno sensitive capabilitybrowser_connectno sensitive capabilitybrowser_consoleno sensitive capabilitybrowser_cookiesno sensitive capabilitybrowser_dialogno sensitive capabilitybrowser_downloadsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_extractno sensitive capabilitybrowser_extract_schemano sensitive capabilitybrowser_handoffno sensitive capabilitybrowser_inspectno sensitive capabilitybrowser_live_viewno sensitive capabilitybrowser_live_view_stopno sensitive capabilitybrowser_metricsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_navigateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_networkno sensitive capabilitybrowser_openno sensitive capabilitybrowser_pdfno sensitive capabilitybrowser_permissionsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_probeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_probe_htmlno sensitive capabilitybrowser_productsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_routeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_runno sensitive capabilitybrowser_screenshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_serp_batchno sensitive capabilitybrowser_snapshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_statusno sensitive capabilitybrowser_tabsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_vaultno sensitive capabilitybrowser_visual_diffno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_forno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (41 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.64 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @fusengine/browser-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Browser 24
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 25 side by side →
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