Ftp (Kynlos) MCP Server
ftp-mcp
npm
v1.5.3
Published by kynlos — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Enterprise-grade MCP server providing heavily optimized FTP/SFTP operations with smart sync, patch/chunk streaming, caching, and explicit read-only security mappings for AI code assistants.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (index.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`index.js:143`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rivate key (e.g. ~/.ssh/id_rsa). This path must be accessible from the environment where the MCP server is running.'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.js
medium Tool "ftp_rmdir" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "ftp_rmdir" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "rmdir" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool ftp_rmdir
low Mutating tool "ftp_rmdir" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ftp_rmdir" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ftp_rmdir
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "ftp_list"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "ftp_list" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool ftp_list · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "ftp_rmdir"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "ftp_rmdir" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool ftp_rmdir · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 33
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ftp_batch_downloadingests untrusted inputftp_downloadingests untrusted inputftp_listreads sensitive dataftp_rmdirwrites filesaudit-projectno sensitive capabilitydeploy-checklistno sensitive capabilitydeploymentno sensitive capabilityftp_analyze_workspaceno sensitive capabilityftp_batch_uploadno sensitive capabilityftp_chmodno sensitive capability
Show 23 more tools ↓
ftp_connectno sensitive capabilityftp_copyno sensitive capabilityftp_deleteno sensitive capabilityftp_deployno sensitive capabilityftp_disk_spaceno sensitive capabilityftp_existsno sensitive capabilityftp_get_contentsno sensitive capabilityftp_list_deploymentsno sensitive capabilityftp_list_transactionsno sensitive capabilityftp_mkdirno sensitive capabilityftp_patch_fileno sensitive capabilityftp_probe_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilityftp_put_contentsno sensitive capabilityftp_renameno sensitive capabilityftp_rollbackno sensitive capabilityftp_searchno sensitive capabilityftp_statno sensitive capabilityftp_syncno sensitive capabilityftp_telemetryno sensitive capabilityftp_treeno sensitive capabilityftp_uploadno sensitive capabilitypathno sensitive capabilityRemote File Contentno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.3 latest |
A 96/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan ftp-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Ftp 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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