Fs Git — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "fs-git-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "fs-git-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "fs-git-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (debug_mcp_methods.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`debug_mcp_methods.py:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "debug_mcp_methods.py"
},
"evidence": "rver process proc = subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, \"mcp_server/server_fastmcp_new.py\"], stdin=su",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "debug_mcp_methods.py",
"line": 17,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_server/cli/main.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp_server/cli/main.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp_server/cli/main.py"
},
"evidence": "Initialize git repo subprocess.run([\"git\", \"init\", repo_root], check=True) # Set safe.directory subprocess.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "mcp_server/cli/main.py",
"line": 42,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_server/git_backend/commits.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp_server/git_backend/commits.py:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp_server/git_backend/commits.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"-C\", repo.root, \"log\", f\"--oneline\", f\"-{window}\", \"--forma",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "mcp_server/git_backend/commits.py",
"line": 22,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_server/git_backend/history.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp_server/git_backend/history.py:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp_server/git_backend/history.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"-C\", repo.root, \"log\", f\"--oneline\", f\"-{limit}\", \"--\", pat",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "mcp_server/git_backend/history.py",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_server/git_backend/repo.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp_server/git_backend/repo.py:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp_server/git_backend/repo.py"
},
"evidence": "safe.directory subprocess.run([\"git\", \"config\", \"--global\", \"--add\", \"safe.directory\", self.root], check=True)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "mcp_server/git_backend/repo.py",
"line": 17,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_server/git_backend/safety.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp_server/git_backend/safety.py:85`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp_server/git_backend/safety.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", repo.root, \"status\", \"--porcelain\"], capture_output=True, text=True",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "mcp_server/git_backend/safety.py",
"line": 85,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_server/git_backend/staging.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp_server/git_backend/staging.py:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp_server/git_backend/staging.py"
},
"evidence": "log_result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"-C\", self.repo.root, \"log\", \"--oneline\", f\"{self.base_b",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "mcp_server/git_backend/staging.py",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_server/git_backend/templates.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`mcp_server/git_backend/templates.py:41`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "mcp_server/git_backend/templates.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( ['git', 'log', f'--oneline', f'-{window}', '--format=%s'],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "mcp_server/git_backend/templates.py",
"line": 41,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"read_with_history\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"read_with_history\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "read_with_history",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"read_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"read_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "read_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (basic_mcp_test.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`basic_mcp_test.py:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "basic_mcp_test.py"
},
"evidence": "h): self.proc = subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, server_path], stdin=subprocess.PIPE,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "basic_mcp_test.py",
"line": 15,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (comprehensive_mcp_test.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`comprehensive_mcp_test.py:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "comprehensive_mcp_test.py"
},
"evidence": "h): self.proc = subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, server_path], stdin=subprocess.PIPE,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "comprehensive_mcp_test.py",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "write_and_commit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_with_history",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "start_staged",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "staged_write",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "staged_preview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "finalize_staged",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "abort_staged",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lint_commit_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "answer_about_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "replace_and_commit_func",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_replace_and_commit_func",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preview_diff_func",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_patch_and_commit_func",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_file_func",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "stat_file_func",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_dir_func",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "make_dir_func",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "replace_and_commit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preview_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "batch_replace_and_commit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_patch_and_commit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stat_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_dir",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "make_dir",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "3aae1e10750a1db96f0f9a7bd84c823efc3a0e2fc62400e91bd66f79ce59ce6e",
"stats": {
"tools": 28,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 8,
"medium": 0,
"low": 4,
"info": 0
}
}
}