Frida Mobile MCP Server
frida-mobile-mcp
npm
v0.2.3
Source verified
Published by monkeywave — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Tool "spawn_process" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "spawn_process" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool spawn_process
high Tool "get_messages" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "get_messages" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool get_messages
high Tool "run_prebuilt_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_prebuilt_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_prebuilt_script
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/fritap/bridge.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/fritap/bridge.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { log } from '../helpers/logger.js'; /** * Run friTap CLI for TLS traffi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/fritap/bridge.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_id" on "get_messages"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "get_messages" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool get_messages · inputSchema.properties.script_id
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_name" on "run_prebuilt_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_prebuilt_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_name" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_prebuilt_script · inputSchema.properties.script_name
low Mutating tool "spawn_process" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "spawn_process" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool spawn_process
low Mutating tool "get_messages" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "get_messages" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool get_messages
low Mutating tool "run_prebuilt_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_prebuilt_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_prebuilt_script
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_messagesruns code / shellrun_prebuilt_scriptruns code / shellspawn_processruns code / shellattach_processno sensitive capabilitybypass_ssl_pinningno sensitive capabilitydetach_sessionno sensitive capabilitydetect_app_technologiesno sensitive capabilityenumerate_exportsno sensitive capabilityenumerate_modulesno sensitive capabilityexecute_scriptno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
explore_appno sensitive capabilityfrida_helpno sensitive capabilityget_device_infono sensitive capabilityget_frontmost_applicationno sensitive capabilityget_statusno sensitive capabilityhook_functionno sensitive capabilityhook_methodno sensitive capabilitykill_processno sensitive capabilitylist_applicationsno sensitive capabilitylist_devicesno sensitive capabilitylist_processesno sensitive capabilitylist_sessionsno sensitive capabilitymobile_actionno sensitive capabilityread_memoryno sensitive capabilityresume_processno sensitive capabilityscan_memoryno sensitive capabilitysearch_classes_and_methodsno sensitive capabilityselect_deviceno sensitive capabilitystop_instrumentationno sensitive capabilitytrace_methodno sensitive capabilityunhook_functionno sensitive capabilitywrite_memoryno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.3 latest |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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