Frida (npm) MCP Server
frida-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
TypeScript MCP server for Frida 17 dynamic instrumentation
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 12 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_session_messages → dump_class → load_script. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow get_session_messages → dump_class → load_script
high Tool "spawn_process" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "spawn_process" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool spawn_process
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/android.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/android.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { dirname, join } from "node:path
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/android.js
low Mutating tool "spawn_process" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "spawn_process" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool spawn_process
Tools 41
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
dump_classreads sensitive dataget_session_messagesingests untrusted inputload_scriptnetwork egressspawn_processruns code / shellandroid_check_frida_serverno sensitive capabilityandroid_get_current_activityno sensitive capabilityandroid_hook_methodno sensitive capabilityandroid_ssl_pinning_disableno sensitive capabilityattach_to_processno sensitive capabilitycall_rpc_exportno sensitive capability
Show 31 more tools ↓
create_interactive_sessionno sensitive capabilityenumerate_devicesno sensitive capabilityenumerate_processesno sensitive capabilityexecute_in_sessionno sensitive capabilityexport_capture_bundleno sensitive capabilityfile_lsno sensitive capabilityfile_readno sensitive capabilityfind_instancesno sensitive capabilityfind_moduleno sensitive capabilityget_archived_session_messagesno sensitive capabilityget_backtraceno sensitive capabilityget_deviceno sensitive capabilityget_local_deviceno sensitive capabilityget_process_by_nameno sensitive capabilityget_usb_deviceno sensitive capabilityhook_functionno sensitive capabilitykill_processno sensitive capabilitylist_appsno sensitive capabilitylist_classesno sensitive capabilitylist_exportsno sensitive capabilitylist_methodsno sensitive capabilitylist_modulesno sensitive capabilitylist_scriptsno sensitive capabilityread_memoryno sensitive capabilityread_session_message_blobno sensitive capabilityresume_processno sensitive capabilityrun_javano sensitive capabilitysearch_frida_docsno sensitive capabilitysearch_memoryno sensitive capabilityunload_scriptno sensitive capabilitywrite_memoryno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (41 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
B 88/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan frida-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Frida 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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