Freecad Robust MCP Server
freecad-robust-mcp
PyPI
v0.6.1
Published by spkane — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (addon/FreecadRobustMCPBridge/freecad_mcp_bridge/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`addon/FreecadRobustMCPBridge/freecad_mcp_bridge/server.py:587`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "exec") exec(compiled, exec_globals) # noqa: S102 elapsed = (time.perf_counter() - start)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server addon/FreecadRobustMCPBridge/freecad_mcp_bridge/server.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/freecad_mcp/bridge/embedded.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/freecad_mcp/bridge/embedded.py:165`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "exec") exec(compiled, exec_globals) # noqa: S102 elapsed = (time.perf_counter() - start)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/freecad_mcp/bridge/embedded.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/freecad_mcp/bridge/socket.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/freecad_mcp/bridge/socket.py:891`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: v in args.items(): exec(f"{{k}} = {{v!r}}") with open(macro_file, "r") as f: macro_code = f.read() exec(macro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/freecad_mcp/bridge/socket.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/freecad_mcp/bridge/xmlrpc.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/freecad_mcp/bridge/xmlrpc.py:873`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: v in args.items(): exec(f"{{k}} = {{v!r}}") # Execute macro with open(macro_file, "r") as f: macro_code = f.re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/freecad_mcp/bridge/xmlrpc.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/just_commands/conftest.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/just_commands/conftest.py:110`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: xt result = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 cmd, cwd=self.project_root,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/just_commands/conftest.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/just_commands/test_docker.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/just_commands/test_docker.py:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ontext result = subprocess.run( ["docker", "info"], # noqa: S607 capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/just_commands/test_docker.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/just_commands/test_release.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/just_commands/test_release.py:285`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: est context subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 ["git", "add", str(test_file)], # noqa: S607
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/just_commands/test_release.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/test_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/test_server.py:335`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: connect proc = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 [ sys.executable, "-
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/test_server.py
Tools 83
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
activate_workbenchno sensitive capabilityadd_sketch_arcno sensitive capabilityadd_sketch_circleno sensitive capabilityadd_sketch_lineno sensitive capabilityadd_sketch_pointno sensitive capabilityadd_sketch_rectangleno sensitive capabilityboolean_operationno sensitive capabilitychamfer_edgesno sensitive capabilityclear_selectionno sensitive capabilityclose_documentno sensitive capability
Show 73 more tools ↓
copy_objectno sensitive capabilitycreate_boxno sensitive capabilitycreate_coneno sensitive capabilitycreate_cylinderno sensitive capabilitycreate_documentno sensitive capabilitycreate_helixno sensitive capabilitycreate_holeno sensitive capabilitycreate_macrono sensitive capabilitycreate_macro_from_templateno sensitive capabilitycreate_objectno sensitive capabilitycreate_partdesign_bodyno sensitive capabilitycreate_sketchno sensitive capabilitycreate_sphereno sensitive capabilitycreate_torusno sensitive capabilitycreate_wedgeno sensitive capabilitydelete_macrono sensitive capabilitydelete_objectno sensitive capabilityedit_objectno sensitive capabilityexecute_pythonno sensitive capabilityexport_3mfno sensitive capabilityexport_igesno sensitive capabilityexport_objno sensitive capabilityexport_stepno sensitive capabilityexport_stlno sensitive capabilityfillet_edgesno sensitive capabilityfit_allno sensitive capabilityget_active_documentno sensitive capabilityget_connection_statusno sensitive capabilityget_console_logno sensitive capabilityget_console_outputno sensitive capabilityget_freecad_versionno sensitive capabilityget_mcp_server_environmentno sensitive capabilityget_screenshotno sensitive capabilityget_selectionno sensitive capabilityget_undo_redo_statusno sensitive capabilitygroove_sketchno sensitive capabilityimport_stepno sensitive capabilityimport_stlno sensitive capabilityinsert_part_from_libraryno sensitive capabilityinspect_objectno sensitive capabilitylinear_patternno sensitive capabilitylist_documentsno sensitive capabilitylist_macrosno sensitive capabilitylist_objectsno sensitive capabilitylist_parts_libraryno sensitive capabilitylist_workbenchesno sensitive capabilityloft_sketchesno sensitive capabilitymirror_objectno sensitive capabilitymirrored_featureno sensitive capabilityopen_documentno sensitive capabilitypad_sketchno sensitive capabilitypocket_sketchno sensitive capabilitypolar_patternno sensitive capabilityread_macrono sensitive capabilityrecomputeno sensitive capabilityrecompute_documentno sensitive capabilityredono sensitive capabilityrevolution_sketchno sensitive capabilityrotate_objectno sensitive capabilityrun_macrono sensitive capabilitysave_documentno sensitive capabilityscale_objectno sensitive capabilityset_camera_positionno sensitive capabilityset_display_modeno sensitive capabilityset_object_colorno sensitive capabilityset_object_visibilityno sensitive capabilityset_placementno sensitive capabilityset_selectionno sensitive capabilityset_view_angleno sensitive capabilitysweep_sketchno sensitive capabilityundono sensitive capabilityzoom_inno sensitive capabilityzoom_outno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (83 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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