Freecad MCP Server
freecad-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.22
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Add your description here
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Tool "execute_code_async" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_code_async" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_code_async
high Tool "execute_code" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_code" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_code
high Shell/command execution in server code (addon/FreeCADMCP/rpc_server/rpc_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`addon/FreeCADMCP/rpc_server/rpc_server.py:172`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: exec(code, globals()) FreeCAD.Console.PrintMessage("Async code execution complet
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server addon/FreeCADMCP/rpc_server/rpc_server.py
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([execute_code_async]) co-exist with external-action tools ([execute_code_async, execute_code]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [execute_code_async] → sinks [execute_code_async, execute_code]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow execute_code_async → execute_code_async
low Mutating tool "execute_code_async" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_code_async" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_code_async
low Mutating tool "execute_code" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_code" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_code
Tools 15
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
execute_code_asyncingests untrusted inputruns code / shellexecute_coderuns code / shellcreate_documentno sensitive capabilitycreate_objectno sensitive capabilitydelete_objectno sensitive capabilityedit_objectno sensitive capabilityget_objectno sensitive capabilityget_objectsno sensitive capabilityget_parts_listno sensitive capabilityget_rpc_statusno sensitive capability
Show 5 more tools ↓
get_viewno sensitive capabilityinsert_part_from_libraryno sensitive capabilitylist_documentsno sensitive capabilityreload_documentno sensitive capabilityrun_fem_analysisno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (15 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.22 latest |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.1.21 |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-01 |
v0.1.20 |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-31 |
v0.1.19 |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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