Free Search MCP Server
free-search-mcp
PyPI
v0.11.0
Published by sweetcornna — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Local-first, no-API-key search MCP server. Multi-engine web search, smart fetching, document reading.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 1 = 99. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_browser_unavailable.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_browser_unavailable.py:198`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : await engine._fetch("https://dummy.example/search") raise AssertionError("expected RequestException")
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_browser_unavailable.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_fetch_safety.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_fetch_safety.py:165`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: await fetcher._http_fetch("https://example.com/start") # We requested only the first URL; the private-IP hop was
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_fetch_safety.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_downloads.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_downloads.py:92`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: b/../../../../root/.ssh/id_rsa", "https://x.example/..%5c..%5cwindows%5csystem32", ], ) def test_traversal_a
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_downloads.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_install_script.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_install_script.py:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .update(env) return subprocess.run( ["bash", str(SCRIPT), *args], cwd=cwd or ROOT, env=merge
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_install_script.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 7
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.11.0 latest |
A 99/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v0.10.0 |
A 99/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v0.9.2 |
A 99/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.9.1 |
A 99/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-01 |
v0.8.0 |
A 99/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-31 |
Show 2 more versions ↓
v0.4.2 |
A 99/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v0.4.1 |
A 99/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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