Frase MCP Server
@frase/mcp-server
npm
v0.9.3
Published by @frase — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Frase MCP Server — The complete content platform for AI agents. Research, write, optimize, and host SEO & GEO-optimized content with built-in AI search visibility monitoring. Includes Frase CMS for auto-optimized web hosting, 120 tools, 9 agent skills, an
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 8 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/mcpb-bundle.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcpb-bundle.js:2961`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcpb-bundle.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/detect-tool.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/detect-tool.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; /** * Get the Claude Desktop config path for the current OS */ function getCla
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/detect-tool.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/init.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/init.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { detectTools } from "./detect-tool.js"; import { writeFraseConfig, hasFr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/init.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcpb-bundle.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcpb-bundle.js:7295`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; function getClaudeDesktopConfigPath() { const os = platform(); if (os === "d
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcpb-bundle.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli/init.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/init.js:110`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`claude mcp add frase -e FRASE_API_KEY=${apiKey} -- npx -y @frase/mcp-server`, { stdio:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/init.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 7
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.3 latest |
B 86/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.9.2 |
B 86/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.7.1 |
B 86/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.7.0 |
B 86/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v0.6.3 |
B 86/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
Show 2 more versions ↓
v0.6.1 |
B 86/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v0.6.0 |
C 74/100 | 8 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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