Foxbridge MCP Server
foxbridge-mcp
npm
v0.1.2
Published by sinamohsenifar — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
FoxBridge — an MCP server + Firefox extension that lets an AI assistant read and drive your real, logged-in Firefox: tabs, DOM, cookies (incl. httpOnly), sessions, storage, and page APIs. Plus on-disk profile reading (cookies, history, sessions, localStor
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Tool "eval_js" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_js" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_js
high Tool "ff_eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ff_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ff_eval
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/driver.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/driver.js:275`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const fn = new Function(`return (async () => { ${src.includes("return") ? src : "return (" + src + ")"} })(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/driver.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (extension/background.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`extension/background.js:54`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: origin). async function exec(tabId, code) { try { const res = await browser.tabs.executeScript(tabId, { code });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server extension/background.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([ff_fetch, ff_download]) co-exist with external-action tools ([eval_js, ff_eval]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [ff_fetch, ff_download] → sinks [eval_js, ff_eval]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow ff_fetch → eval_js
low Mutating tool "eval_js" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_js" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_js
low Mutating tool "ff_eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ff_eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ff_eval
Tools 52
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
eval_jsruns code / shellff_downloadingests untrusted inputff_evalruns code / shellff_fetchingests untrusted inputbrowser_startno sensitive capabilityclear_cookiesno sensitive capabilityclear_disk_cacheno sensitive capabilityclear_web_storageno sensitive capabilityclickno sensitive capabilityclose_browserno sensitive capability
Show 42 more tools ↓
close_tabno sensitive capabilityff_activate_tabno sensitive capabilityff_clear_networkno sensitive capabilityff_clickno sensitive capabilityff_close_tabno sensitive capabilityff_get_cookiesno sensitive capabilityff_list_downloadsno sensitive capabilityff_list_tabsno sensitive capabilityff_navigateno sensitive capabilityff_networkno sensitive capabilityff_open_tabno sensitive capabilityff_read_pageno sensitive capabilityff_reloadno sensitive capabilityff_screenshotno sensitive capabilityff_scrollno sensitive capabilityff_statusno sensitive capabilityff_typeno sensitive capabilityff_wait_forno sensitive capabilityget_bookmarksno sensitive capabilityget_cache_infono sensitive capabilityget_cookiesno sensitive capabilityget_historyno sensitive capabilityget_live_cookiesno sensitive capabilityget_local_storageno sensitive capabilityget_sessionsno sensitive capabilitygo_backno sensitive capabilitygo_forwardno sensitive capabilityhoverno sensitive capabilitylist_profilesno sensitive capabilitylist_tabsno sensitive capabilitynavigateno sensitive capabilityopen_tabno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilityread_pageno sensitive capabilityreloadno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityscrollno sensitive capabilityselect_optionno sensitive capabilityset_cookieno sensitive capabilityswitch_tabno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilitywait_forno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (52 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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