Fovux (oaslananka) MCP Server
fovux-mcp
PyPI
v1.6.2
Published by oaslananka — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Local-first edge-AI computer vision workbench MCP server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 19
high Tool "eval_compare" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_compare" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_compare
high Tool "eval_error_analysis" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_error_analysis" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_error_analysis
high Tool "eval_per_class" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_per_class" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_per_class
high Tool "eval_run" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_run" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_run
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/fovux/core/processes.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/fovux/core/processes.py:216`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pend("/F") result = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 args, capture_output=True, check=False,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/fovux/core/processes.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/fovux/tools/train_resume.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/fovux/tools/train_resume.py:80`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r_fh proc = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 - fixed local module execution only command,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/fovux/tools/train_resume.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/fovux/tools/train_start.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/fovux/tools/train_start.py:166`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r_fh proc = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 - fixed local module execution only command,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/fovux/tools/train_start.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/fovux/tools/train_status.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/fovux/tools/train_status.py:72`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - fixed Windows system utility only [tasklist, "/F
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/fovux/tools/train_status.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/fovux/tools/train_stop.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/fovux/tools/train_stop.py:125`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ppend(flag) subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, check=False) # noqa: S603 else: i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/fovux/tools/train_stop.py
low Mutating tool "eval_compare" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_compare" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_compare
low Mutating tool "eval_error_analysis" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_error_analysis" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_error_analysis
low Mutating tool "eval_per_class" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_per_class" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_per_class
low Mutating tool "eval_run" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_run" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_run
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/tools/test_export.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/tools/test_export.py:159`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _RawModel: def eval(self) -> None: return None def __call__(self, tensor: object) -> np.nd
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/tools/test_export.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/integration/test_real_server_smoke.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/integration/test_real_server_smoke.py:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e module.""" proc = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603, S607 [ sys.executable, "-m",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/integration/test_real_server_smoke.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/test_agent_policy_checker.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/test_agent_policy_checker.py:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ership.""" result = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 [sys.executable, str(CHECKER)], capture_output=Tru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/test_agent_policy_checker.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/test_dependency_boundaries.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/test_dependency_boundaries.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 0)" ) result = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - fixed interpreter and constant import probe. [sys.execut
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/test_dependency_boundaries.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/test_server_startup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/test_server_startup.py:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ), })) """ result = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 [sys.executable, "-c", script], cwd=PACKAGE_ROOT,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/test_server_startup.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/test_tool_docs.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/test_tool_docs.py:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pages.""" result = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 [sys.executable, str(CHECK_TOOL_DOCS)], capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/test_tool_docs.py
Tools 47
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
eval_compareruns code / shelleval_error_analysisruns code / shelleval_per_classruns code / shelleval_runruns code / shellactive_learning_queue_listno sensitive capabilityactive_learning_queue_rankno sensitive capabilityactive_learning_queue_submitno sensitive capabilityactive_learning_selectno sensitive capabilityannotation_quality_checkno sensitive capabilitybenchmark_latencyno sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
dataset_augmentno sensitive capabilitydataset_convertno sensitive capabilitydataset_find_duplicatesno sensitive capabilitydataset_inspectno sensitive capabilitydataset_splitno sensitive capabilitydataset_validateno sensitive capabilitydemo_initno sensitive capabilitydeployment_adviseno sensitive capabilitydistill_modelno sensitive capabilityexport_onnxno sensitive capabilityexport_reproducibility_bundleno sensitive capabilityexport_tfliteno sensitive capabilityfovux_doctorno sensitive capabilitygenerate_support_bundleno sensitive capabilityget_policy_statusno sensitive capabilityinfer_batchno sensitive capabilityinfer_ensembleno sensitive capabilityinfer_imageno sensitive capabilityinfer_rtspno sensitive capabilitylist_audit_eventsno sensitive capabilitymodel_compare_visualno sensitive capabilitymodel_listno sensitive capabilitymodel_profileno sensitive capabilityquantize_int8no sensitive capabilityquantize_reportno sensitive capabilityrun_archiveno sensitive capabilityrun_compareno sensitive capabilityrun_deleteno sensitive capabilityrun_tagno sensitive capabilityset_policy_modeno sensitive capabilitysync_to_mlflowno sensitive capabilitytrain_adjustno sensitive capabilitytrain_preflightno sensitive capabilitytrain_resumeno sensitive capabilitytrain_startno sensitive capabilitytrain_statusno sensitive capabilitytrain_stopno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (47 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.6.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 19 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.6.0 |
A 98/100 | 12 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan fovux-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Fovux 1
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