Forge (JonasAbde) MCP Server
forge-mcp
npm
v2.3.0
Published by jonasabde — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for the Hermes Forge platform — discover, open, chat with, fuse, and deploy AI Agent Packs via the Model Context Protocol
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "deploy_agent_to_telegram"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "deploy_agent_to_telegram" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow deploy_agent_to_telegram
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([deploy_agent_to_telegram]) and tools that can send data out ([deploy_agent_to_telegram, forge_list_deployments]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [deploy_agent_to_telegram] → sinks [deploy_agent_to_telegram, forge_list_deployments]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow deploy_agent_to_telegram → forge_list_deployments
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
deploy_agent_to_telegramnetwork egressreads sensitive dataforge_list_deploymentsnetwork egressAgent Evolution Stateno sensitive capabilityAgent Packs Catalogno sensitive capabilityagent_cardno sensitive capabilityagentIdno sensitive capabilitybaseAgentIdno sensitive capabilitychat_with_agentno sensitive capabilityevolution_reportno sensitive capabilityfodderAgentIdno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
forge_agent_lineageno sensitive capabilityforge_agent_traitsno sensitive capabilityforge_claim_mission_rewardno sensitive capabilityforge_complete_missionno sensitive capabilityforge_get_agentno sensitive capabilityforge_get_packno sensitive capabilityforge_get_profileno sensitive capabilityforge_list_activitiesno sensitive capabilityforge_list_agent_runsno sensitive capabilityforge_list_agentsno sensitive capabilityforge_list_leaderboardno sensitive capabilityforge_list_missionsno sensitive capabilityforge_list_packsno sensitive capabilityforge_search_packsno sensitive capabilityforge_start_missionno sensitive capabilityfuse_agentsno sensitive capabilityfusion_guideno sensitive capabilityget_magic_linkno sensitive capabilityMy Agentsno sensitive capabilityopen_packno sensitive capabilitypack_summaryno sensitive capabilitypackIdno sensitive capabilitysubscribe_tierno sensitive capabilityUser Profileno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 2
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.3.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan forge-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Forge 15
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 16 side by side →
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