Fokus App MCP Server
@fokus-app/mcp
npm
v0.2.0
Published by @fokus-app — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; // src/auth/credentials.ts import { randomUUID } from "crypto"; import fs from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
apply_scheduling_jobno sensitive capabilityauto_schedule_tasksno sensitive capabilitybulk_create_tasksno sensitive capabilitycancel_scheduling_jobno sensitive capabilitycomplete_taskno sensitive capabilitycreate_bucketno sensitive capabilitycreate_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_noteno sensitive capabilitycreate_objectiveno sensitive capabilitycreate_reminderno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
create_tagno sensitive capabilitycreate_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_bucketno sensitive capabilitydelete_eventno sensitive capabilitydelete_noteno sensitive capabilitydelete_objectiveno sensitive capabilitydelete_reminderno sensitive capabilitydelete_taskno sensitive capabilityget_current_datetimeno sensitive capabilityget_current_userno sensitive capabilityget_eventno sensitive capabilityget_noteno sensitive capabilityget_objectiveno sensitive capabilityget_scheduleno sensitive capabilityget_scheduling_jobno sensitive capabilityget_taskno sensitive capabilitylist_bucketsno sensitive capabilitylist_calendarsno sensitive capabilitylist_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_notesno sensitive capabilitylist_objectivesno sensitive capabilitylist_remindersno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilitylist_tasksno sensitive capabilitylist_workspacesno sensitive capabilityrollover_objectiveno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilityset_active_workspaceno sensitive capabilityupdate_bucketno sensitive capabilityupdate_eventno sensitive capabilityupdate_noteno sensitive capabilityupdate_objectiveno sensitive capabilityupdate_reminderno sensitive capabilityupdate_taskno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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