Fodda MCP Server
fodda-mcp
npm
v1.46.31
Published by piers-fawkes — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Fodda MCP Server for accessing knowledge graph insights.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/verify.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/verify.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { createInterface } from 'readline'; async function runTest() { conso
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/verify.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/verify_hmac.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/verify_hmac.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import dotenv from 'dotenv'; import path from 'path'; // Load env vars dotenv.co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/verify_hmac.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/verify_tools_endpoint.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/verify_tools_endpoint.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import axios from 'axios'; import { MCP_SERVER_VERSION } from './tools.js'; asyn
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/verify_tools_endpoint.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/sessionTracker.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/sessionTracker.js:33`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await fetch('https://slack.com/api/chat.postMessage', { method: 'POST', header
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sessionTracker.js
Tools 47
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_domain_intelligenceingests untrusted inputget_expert_intelligenceingests untrusted inputget_neighborsingests untrusted inputget_report_intelligenceingests untrusted inputsearch_graphingests untrusted inputsearch_insightsingests untrusted inputbegin_expert_onboardingno sensitive capabilitybrainstorm_topicno sensitive capabilitybrand_trackerno sensitive capabilitycheck_deliverable_statusno sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
check_research_statusno sensitive capabilitycheck_supplemental_statusno sensitive capabilityconfirm_themesno sensitive capabilityconsult_analystno sensitive capabilityconsult_human_agentno sensitive capabilitydeep_research_topicno sensitive capabilitydiscover_adjacent_trendsno sensitive capabilitydraft_linkedin_articleno sensitive capabilitydraft_linkedin_postno sensitive capabilityexpert_onboarding_researchno sensitive capabilitygenerate_visualno sensitive capabilityget_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilityget_company_earningsno sensitive capabilityget_detected_themesno sensitive capabilityget_earnings_divergenceno sensitive capabilityget_earnings_intelligenceno sensitive capabilityget_evidenceno sensitive capabilityget_label_valuesno sensitive capabilityget_my_accountno sensitive capabilityget_my_earningsno sensitive capabilityget_nodeno sensitive capabilityget_onboarding_statusno sensitive capabilityget_supplemental_contextno sensitive capabilityget_validated_trendsno sensitive capabilitylist_analystsno sensitive capabilitylist_graphsno sensitive capabilitymanage_scheduled_reportsno sensitive capabilityread_urlno sensitive capabilityrequest_deliverableno sensitive capabilityschedule_interviewno sensitive capabilitysearch_statisticsno sensitive capabilitysend_feedbackno sensitive capabilitysign_up_free_accountno sensitive capabilitysubmit_basic_infono sensitive capabilitysubmit_expertise_analysisno sensitive capabilitytoggle_graph_preferenceno sensitive capabilityupdate_user_profileno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (47 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.46.31 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.38.0 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v1.32.1 |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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