Coolify (fndchagas) MCP Server
@fndchagas/coolify-mcp
npm
v2.3.1
Source verified
Published by frndchagas — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Coolify API.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 10 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: getLogs → databaseBackups → scheduledTasks. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow getLogs → databaseBackups → scheduledTasks
high Tool "scheduledTasks" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "scheduledTasks" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool scheduledTasks
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "scheduledTasks"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "scheduledTasks" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool scheduledTasks · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "scheduledTasks" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "scheduledTasks" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool scheduledTasks
Tools 65
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
databaseBackupsreads sensitive datagetLogsingests untrusted inputscheduledTasksruns code / shellapplicationEnvsno sensitive capabilitycancelDeploymentno sensitive capabilitycontrolDatabaseno sensitive capabilitycontrolServiceno sensitive capabilitycreateApplicationno sensitive capabilitycreateDatabaseno sensitive capabilitycreateEnvironmentno sensitive capability
Show 55 more tools ↓
createPrivateKeyno sensitive capabilitycreateProjectno sensitive capabilitycreateServerno sensitive capabilitycreateServiceno sensitive capabilitydatabaseEnvsno sensitive capabilitydeleteApplicationno sensitive capabilitydeleteDatabaseno sensitive capabilitydeletePreviewno sensitive capabilitydeletePrivateKeyno sensitive capabilitydeleteProjectno sensitive capabilitydeleteServerno sensitive capabilitydeleteServiceno sensitive capabilitydeployno sensitive capabilitydiagnoseAppno sensitive capabilitydiagnoseServerno sensitive capabilitygetApplicationno sensitive capabilitygetDatabaseno sensitive capabilitygetDeploymentno sensitive capabilitygetGithubAppBranchesno sensitive capabilitygetGithubAppRepositoriesno sensitive capabilitygetHealthno sensitive capabilitygetInfrastructureOverviewno sensitive capabilitygetPrivateKeyno sensitive capabilitygetServerno sensitive capabilitygetServerDomainsno sensitive capabilitygetServerResourcesno sensitive capabilitygetServiceno sensitive capabilitylistAppDeploymentsno sensitive capabilitylistApplicationsno sensitive capabilitylistDatabasesno sensitive capabilitylistDeploymentsno sensitive capabilitylistEnvironmentsno sensitive capabilitylistGithubAppsno sensitive capabilitylistPrivateKeysno sensitive capabilitylistProjectsno sensitive capabilitylistResourcesno sensitive capabilitylistServersno sensitive capabilitylistServicesno sensitive capabilityredeployProjectno sensitive capabilityrestartApplicationno sensitive capabilityrestartProjectAppsno sensitive capabilitysearchDocsno sensitive capabilityserviceEnvsno sensitive capabilitystartApplicationno sensitive capabilitystopAllApplicationsno sensitive capabilitystopApplicationno sensitive capabilitystoragesno sensitive capabilityteamsno sensitive capabilityupdateApplicationno sensitive capabilityupdateDatabaseno sensitive capabilityupdatePrivateKeyno sensitive capabilityupdateProjectno sensitive capabilityupdateServerno sensitive capabilityupdateServiceno sensitive capabilityvalidateServerno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (65 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.3.1 latest |
A 90/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.2.1 |
A 90/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-23 |
v2.2.0 |
A 90/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v0.1.4 |
A 96/100 | 0 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @fndchagas/coolify-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Coolify 9
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 10 side by side →
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