Flowengine N8n Workflow Builder MCP Server
flowengine-n8n-workflow-builder
npm
v4.4.4
Published by ami3466 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Build n8n workflows from text using AI. Connect to Claude, Cursor, or any LLM to generate and validate n8n workflows with expert knowledge and intelligent auto-fixing. Built by FlowEngine. Now with real node parameter schemas from n8n packages!
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/lib/security.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/security.js:49`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: message: 'Use of eval() detected - potential code injection', node: node.name,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/security.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/lib/security.ts)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/lib/security.ts:66`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: message: 'Use of eval() detected - potential code injection', node: node.name, recommendation
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lib/security.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/security.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/security.js:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ing' && (code.includes('child_process') || code.includes('exec'))) { issues.push({ s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/security.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/lib/security.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/lib/security.ts:82`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ing' && (code.includes('child_process') || code.includes('exec'))) { issues.push({ severity: 'critical
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lib/security.ts
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/lib/node-descriptions.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/node-descriptions.js:50`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: onst nodeModule = await import(nodeModulePath); // Get the node class - find the class constructor export
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/node-descriptions.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/lib/node-loader.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/node-loader.js:51`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: onst nodeModule = await import(nodeModulePath); // Get the default export (the node class) const NodeCla
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/node-loader.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/lib/node-descriptions.ts)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/lib/node-descriptions.ts:63`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: onst nodeModule = await import(nodeModulePath); // Get the node class - find the class constructor export let N
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lib/node-descriptions.ts
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/lib/node-loader.ts)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/lib/node-loader.ts:87`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: onst nodeModule = await import(nodeModulePath); // Get the default export (the node class) const NodeClass = no
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lib/node-loader.ts
Tools 28
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
Workflow Templates Libraryingests untrusted inputadd_connectionno sensitive capabilityadd_nodeno sensitive capabilityAI Agent Workflow Exampleno sensitive capabilityanalyze_performanceno sensitive capabilityanalyze_workflowno sensitive capabilitybuild_workflowno sensitive capabilitydelete_nodeno sensitive capabilityedit_nodeno sensitive capabilityEmail to Slack Workflow Exampleno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
explain_workflowno sensitive capabilityextract_workflow_jsonno sensitive capabilityfix_jsonno sensitive capabilityget_node_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_templateno sensitive capabilityget_workflow_detailsno sensitive capabilitylist_nodes_by_categoryno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilityn8n-workflow-expertno sensitive capabilityscan_securityno sensitive capabilitysearch_nodesno sensitive capabilitysearch_templatesno sensitive capabilitysuggest_architectureno sensitive capabilitysuggest_improvementsno sensitive capabilitysuggest_nodesno sensitive capabilitytaskno sensitive capabilitytest_workflowno sensitive capabilityvalidate_workflowno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.4.4 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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