Floomhq MCP Server
@floomhq/mcp-server
npm
v0.1.8
Source verified
Published by floomhq — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Floom, lets AI agents deploy and run apps
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: fetch_context → get_logs → deploy. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow fetch_context → get_logs → deploy
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
deploynetwork egressfetch_contextingests untrusted inputget_logsreads sensitive datarefresh_contextingests untrusted inputcreate_from_templateno sensitive capabilitycreate_scheduleno sensitive capabilitycreate_share_linkno sensitive capabilitydelete_contextno sensitive capabilitydelete_projectno sensitive capabilitydelete_scheduleno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
deploy_from_githubno sensitive capabilitydisable_share_linkno sensitive capabilitydisable_webhooksno sensitive capabilityenable_webhooksno sensitive capabilityget_contextno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_templateno sensitive capabilitylist_contextsno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_schedulesno sensitive capabilitylist_share_linksno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_versionsno sensitive capabilitymanage_secretsno sensitive capabilitypromoteno sensitive capabilityrollbackno sensitive capabilityrunno sensitive capabilitystorage_deleteno sensitive capabilitystorage_getno sensitive capabilitystorage_listno sensitive capabilitystorage_setno sensitive capabilityupdate_projectno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.8 latest |
A 94/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @floomhq/mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Floomhq 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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