Sftp Orchestrator MCP Server
@fkom13/mcp-sftp-orchestrator
npm
v11.3.0
Published by @fkom13 — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Un serveur MCP stdio pour l'orchestration de tâches distantes avec exécution hybride (synchrone/asynchrone) et configuration flexible.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 25
high Tool "task_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "task_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "cmd"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool task_exec
high Tool "task_exec_interactive" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "task_exec_interactive" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "cmd"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool task_exec_interactive
high Tool "task_exec_sequence" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "task_exec_sequence" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool task_exec_sequence
high Tool "shell_create" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell_create" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell_create
high Tool "shell_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell_exec
high Tool "shell_list" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell_list" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell_list
high Tool "shell_close" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell_close" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell_close
high Tool "tmux_create" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "tmux_create" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "cmd"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool tmux_create
high Tool "tmux_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "tmux_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "cmd"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool tmux_exec
high Shell/command execution in server code (tunnels.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tunnels.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import fs from 'fs/promises'; import path from 'path'; import config from './con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tunnels.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "cmd" on "task_exec"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "task_exec" takes a command-shaped parameter "cmd" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool task_exec · inputSchema.properties.cmd
medium Unconstrained command parameter "cmd" on "task_exec_interactive"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "task_exec_interactive" takes a command-shaped parameter "cmd" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool task_exec_interactive · inputSchema.properties.cmd
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "task_exec_sequence"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "task_exec_sequence" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool task_exec_sequence · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "shell_exec"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "shell_exec" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool shell_exec · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "start_cmd" on "tmux_create"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "tmux_create" takes a command-shaped parameter "start_cmd" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool tmux_create · inputSchema.properties.start_cmd
medium Unconstrained command parameter "cmd" on "tmux_exec"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "tmux_exec" takes a command-shaped parameter "cmd" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool tmux_exec · inputSchema.properties.cmd
low Mutating tool "task_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "task_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool task_exec
low Mutating tool "task_exec_interactive" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "task_exec_interactive" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool task_exec_interactive
low Mutating tool "task_exec_sequence" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "task_exec_sequence" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool task_exec_sequence
low Mutating tool "shell_create" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell_create" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell_create
low Mutating tool "shell_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell_exec
low Mutating tool "shell_list" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell_list" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell_list
low Mutating tool "shell_close" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell_close" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell_close
low Mutating tool "tmux_create" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "tmux_create" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool tmux_create
low Mutating tool "tmux_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "tmux_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool tmux_exec
Tools 66
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
shell_closeruns code / shellshell_createruns code / shellshell_execruns code / shellshell_listruns code / shelltask_execruns code / shelltask_exec_interactiveruns code / shelltask_exec_sequenceruns code / shelltmux_createruns code / shelltmux_execruns code / shellapi_addno sensitive capability
Show 56 more tools ↓
api_checkno sensitive capabilityapi_listno sensitive capabilityapi_removeno sensitive capabilitycheck_api_healthno sensitive capabilitycompare_all_sourcesno sensitive capabilitydiff_filesno sensitive capabilitydiff_foldersno sensitive capabilityfile_editno sensitive capabilityfile_readno sensitive capabilityfile_writeno sensitive capabilityget_docker_logsno sensitive capabilityget_fail2ban_statusno sensitive capabilityget_pm2_logsno sensitive capabilityget_services_statusno sensitive capabilityget_system_resourcesno sensitive capabilityguideno sensitive capabilityhelpno sensitive capabilityinfra_overviewno sensitive capabilitypolicy_blocklist_addno sensitive capabilitypolicy_blocklist_listno sensitive capabilitypolicy_blocklist_removeno sensitive capabilitypool_statsno sensitive capabilityqueue_statsno sensitive capabilityserver_addno sensitive capabilityserver_listno sensitive capabilityserver_note_getno sensitive capabilityserver_note_listno sensitive capabilityserver_note_removeno sensitive capabilityserver_note_setno sensitive capabilityserver_removeno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_createno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_deleteno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_diffno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_listno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_restoreno sensitive capabilitysystem_diagnosticsno sensitive capabilitytail_fileno sensitive capabilitytask_historyno sensitive capabilitytask_logsno sensitive capabilitytask_queueno sensitive capabilitytask_retryno sensitive capabilitytask_statusno sensitive capabilitytask_transferno sensitive capabilitytask_transfer_multino sensitive capabilitytask_waitno sensitive capabilitytestno sensitive capabilitytest_toolno sensitive capabilitytest_tool_with_paramsno sensitive capabilitytmux_killno sensitive capabilitytmux_listno sensitive capabilitytmux_readno sensitive capabilitytunnel_allowlist_addno sensitive capabilitytunnel_allowlist_removeno sensitive capabilitytunnel_closeno sensitive capabilitytunnel_createno sensitive capabilitytunnel_listno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (66 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v11.3.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 25 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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