Fizzy Do MCP Server
fizzy-do-mcp
npm
v0.5.1
Published by ryanyogan — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for integrating AI agents with Fizzy, Basecamp's task management tool
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import * as path from "node:path"; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([fizzy_list_cards]) co-exist with external-action tools ([fizzy_create_comment, fizzy_get_webhook, fizzy_create_webhook, fizzy_update_webhook, fizzy_delete_webhook, fizzy_test_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [fizzy_list_cards] → sinks [fizzy_create_comment, fizzy_get_webhook, fizzy_create_webhook, fizzy_update_webhook, fizzy_delete_webhook, fizzy_test_webh
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow fizzy_list_cards → fizzy_create_comment
Tools 73
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fizzy_create_commentnetwork egressfizzy_create_webhooknetwork egressfizzy_delete_webhooknetwork egressfizzy_get_webhooknetwork egressfizzy_list_cardsingests untrusted inputfizzy_test_webhooknetwork egressfizzy_update_webhooknetwork egressfizzy_add_card_reactionno sensitive capabilityfizzy_add_comment_reactionno sensitive capabilityfizzy_assign_cardno sensitive capability
Show 63 more tools ↓
fizzy_close_cardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_create_boardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_create_cardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_create_columnno sensitive capabilityfizzy_create_stepno sensitive capabilityfizzy_delete_boardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_delete_cardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_delete_columnno sensitive capabilityfizzy_delete_commentno sensitive capabilityfizzy_delete_stepno sensitive capabilityfizzy_get_accountno sensitive capabilityfizzy_get_boardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_get_cardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_get_columnno sensitive capabilityfizzy_get_commentno sensitive capabilityfizzy_get_identityno sensitive capabilityfizzy_get_notificationno sensitive capabilityfizzy_get_userno sensitive capabilityfizzy_list_boardsno sensitive capabilityfizzy_list_card_reactionsno sensitive capabilityfizzy_list_columnsno sensitive capabilityfizzy_list_comment_reactionsno sensitive capabilityfizzy_list_commentsno sensitive capabilityfizzy_list_notificationsno sensitive capabilityfizzy_list_stepsno sensitive capabilityfizzy_list_tagsno sensitive capabilityfizzy_list_usersno sensitive capabilityfizzy_list_webhooksno sensitive capabilityfizzy_mark_all_notifications_readno sensitive capabilityfizzy_mark_goldenno sensitive capabilityfizzy_mark_notification_readno sensitive capabilityfizzy_notification_countno sensitive capabilityfizzy_pending_work_abandonno sensitive capabilityfizzy_pending_work_claimno sensitive capabilityfizzy_pending_work_completeno sensitive capabilityfizzy_pending_work_getno sensitive capabilityfizzy_pending_work_listno sensitive capabilityfizzy_pending_work_statusno sensitive capabilityfizzy_pin_cardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_pm_actionable_cardsno sensitive capabilityfizzy_pm_end_sessionno sensitive capabilityfizzy_pm_project_contextno sensitive capabilityfizzy_pm_report_progressno sensitive capabilityfizzy_pm_start_sessionno sensitive capabilityfizzy_postpone_cardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_publish_boardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_remove_card_reactionno sensitive capabilityfizzy_remove_comment_reactionno sensitive capabilityfizzy_reopen_cardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_tag_cardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_toggle_stepno sensitive capabilityfizzy_triage_cardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_unmark_goldenno sensitive capabilityfizzy_unpin_cardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_unpublish_boardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_untriage_cardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_unwatch_cardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_update_boardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_update_cardno sensitive capabilityfizzy_update_columnno sensitive capabilityfizzy_update_commentno sensitive capabilityfizzy_update_stepno sensitive capabilityfizzy_watch_cardno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (73 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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