First Ch Tools MCP Server

@first-ch/tools-mcp npm v0.28.0 Source verified

Published by first-ch — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

First CH Tools の計算ロジック(WCAGコントラスト比・文字数/Xウェイト・WebP変換・JSON-LD生成・llms.txt生成)をMCPツールとして提供するサーバー

Trust grade
A
94/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 94/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
Share this Trust Score
𝕏 Share LinkedIn Reddit
A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 94/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

high Shell/command execution in server code (marp.mjs)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`marp.mjs:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server marp.mjs

Tools 30

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • aspect_ratio_calcno sensitive capability
  • base64_encodeno sensitive capability
  • case_convertno sensitive capability
  • color_convertno sensitive capability
  • contrast_checkno sensitive capability
  • count_charsno sensitive capability
  • cron_explainno sensitive capability
  • csv_convertno sensitive capability
  • diff_checkno sensitive capability
  • encoding_convertno sensitive capability
Show 20 more tools ↓
  • hash_generateno sensitive capability
  • html_escapeno sensitive capability
  • json_to_yamlno sensitive capability
  • jsonld_generateno sensitive capability
  • jwt_decodeno sensitive capability
  • llmstxt_generateno sensitive capability
  • markdown_tableno sensitive capability
  • marp_renderno sensitive capability
  • px_rem_convertno sensitive capability
  • qr_generateno sensitive capability
  • robotstxt_generateno sensitive capability
  • sql_formatno sensitive capability
  • testdata_generateno sensitive capability
  • unixtime_convertno sensitive capability
  • url_paramsno sensitive capability
  • user_agent_parseno sensitive capability
  • uuid_generateno sensitive capability
  • webp_convertno sensitive capability
  • yaml_to_jsonno sensitive capability
  • zenkaku_convertno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 5

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.28.0 latest A 94/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-09
v0.26.0 A 94/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-01
v0.25.0 A 94/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-29
v0.24.1 A 94/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-27
v0.4.1 A 99/100 0 1.13.0 2026-08-25

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 94/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
[![MCP Trust Score](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/first-ch-tools-mcp/badge.svg)](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/first-ch-tools-mcp)
HTML
<a href="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/first-ch-tools-mcp"><img src="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/first-ch-tools-mcp/badge.svg" alt="MCP Trust Score" height="20"></a>
Prefer shields.io styling? Point it at https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/first-ch-tools-mcp/badge.json via https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=…

Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @first-ch/tools-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

More in Developer Tools