Files Com MCP Server
files-com-mcp
PyPI
v1.0.80
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP for the Files.com API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([Download_File_to_Local, List_Bundle_Download]) co-exist with external-action tools ([Upload_File_from_Local]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [Download_File_to_Local, List_Bundle_Download] → sinks [Upload_File_from_Local]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow Download_File_to_Local → Upload_File_from_Local
medium Tool "Delete_File" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "Delete_File" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool Delete_File
medium Tool "Move_File" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "Move_File" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool Move_File
low Mutating tool "Delete_File" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "Delete_File" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool Delete_File
low Mutating tool "Move_File" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "Move_File" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool Move_File
Tools 68
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
Delete_Filewrites filesDownload_File_to_Localingests untrusted inputList_Bundle_Downloadingests untrusted inputMove_Filewrites filesUpload_File_from_Localnetwork egressCheck_Platform_Statusno sensitive capabilityCopy_Fileno sensitive capabilityCreate_Bundleno sensitive capabilityCreate_Bundle_Notificationno sensitive capabilityCreate_Bundle_Recipientno sensitive capability
Show 58 more tools ↓
Create_Folderno sensitive capabilityCreate_Groupno sensitive capabilityCreate_Permissionno sensitive capabilityCreate_Userno sensitive capabilityDelete_Bundleno sensitive capabilityDelete_Bundle_Notificationno sensitive capabilityDelete_Groupno sensitive capabilityDelete_Permissionno sensitive capabilityDelete_Userno sensitive capabilityFind_Automationno sensitive capabilityFind_Bundleno sensitive capabilityFind_Bundle_Notificationno sensitive capabilityFind_Fileno sensitive capabilityFind_Groupno sensitive capabilityFind_Remote_Serverno sensitive capabilityFind_Userno sensitive capabilityGpg_Decrypt_Fileno sensitive capabilityGpg_Encrypt_Fileno sensitive capabilityHello_Worldno sensitive capabilityList_Action_Logno sensitive capabilityList_Api_Request_Logno sensitive capabilityList_Automationno sensitive capabilityList_Automation_Logno sensitive capabilityList_Bundleno sensitive capabilityList_Bundle_Notificationno sensitive capabilityList_Bundle_Recipientno sensitive capabilityList_Bundle_Registrationno sensitive capabilityList_Email_Logno sensitive capabilityList_Exavault_Api_Request_Logno sensitive capabilityList_External_Eventno sensitive capabilityList_File_Migration_Logno sensitive capabilityList_For_File_Historyno sensitive capabilityList_For_Folderno sensitive capabilityList_For_Folder_Historyno sensitive capabilityList_For_User_Historyno sensitive capabilityList_Ftp_Action_Logno sensitive capabilityList_Groupno sensitive capabilityList_Historyno sensitive capabilityList_Inbound_S3_Logno sensitive capabilityList_Logins_Historyno sensitive capabilityList_Outbound_Connection_Logno sensitive capabilityList_Permissionno sensitive capabilityList_Public_Hosting_Request_Logno sensitive capabilityList_Remote_Serverno sensitive capabilityList_Scim_Logno sensitive capabilityList_Settings_Changeno sensitive capabilityList_Sftp_Action_Logno sensitive capabilityList_Sync_Logno sensitive capabilityList_Userno sensitive capabilityList_Web_Dav_Action_Logno sensitive capabilityTransform_Fileno sensitive capabilityUnzip_Fileno sensitive capabilityUpdate_Bundleno sensitive capabilityUpdate_Bundle_Notificationno sensitive capabilityUpdate_Groupno sensitive capabilityUpdate_Userno sensitive capabilityZip_Fileno sensitive capabilityZip_List_Contents_Fileno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (68 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.80 latest |
A 95/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.0.79 |
A 95/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v1.0.78 |
A 95/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
v1.0.77 |
A 95/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v1.0.75 |
A 95/100 | 5 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v1.0.74 |
A 95/100 | 5 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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