Figmind MCP Server
figmind
npm
v1.0.0
Published by guhcostan — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Connect Cursor AI to Figma via MCP (Model Context Protocol) — read and modify designs in real time
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_pages, set_current_page]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_comment]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_pages, set_current_page] → sinks [create_comment]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_pages → create_comment
Tools 55
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_commentnetwork egressget_pagesingests untrusted inputset_current_pageingests untrusted inputadd_variable_modeno sensitive capabilityapply_styleno sensitive capabilityapply_variable_to_nodeno sensitive capabilitybulk_updateno sensitive capabilitycreate_component_instanceno sensitive capabilitycreate_frameno sensitive capabilitycreate_from_htmlno sensitive capability
Show 45 more tools ↓
create_from_svgno sensitive capabilitycreate_pageno sensitive capabilitycreate_sectionno sensitive capabilitycreate_shapeno sensitive capabilitycreate_textno sensitive capabilitycreate_variableno sensitive capabilitycreate_variable_collectionno sensitive capabilitydelete_nodesno sensitive capabilitydelete_variableno sensitive capabilitydelete_variable_collectionno sensitive capabilitydetach_instanceno sensitive capabilityduplicate_nodeno sensitive capabilityexecuteno sensitive capabilityexport_batchno sensitive capabilityexport_nodeno sensitive capabilityexport_pageno sensitive capabilityfind_component_setsno sensitive capabilityfind_componentsno sensitive capabilityfind_components_in_pageno sensitive capabilityfind_nodesno sensitive capabilityget_commentsno sensitive capabilityget_component_propertiesno sensitive capabilityget_design_system_kitno sensitive capabilityget_file_contextno sensitive capabilityget_file_infono sensitive capabilityget_file_nodesno sensitive capabilityget_file_variablesno sensitive capabilityget_full_treeno sensitive capabilityget_linked_library_tokensno sensitive capabilityget_nodeno sensitive capabilityget_selectionno sensitive capabilityget_used_fontsno sensitive capabilitymove_nodeno sensitive capabilityrename_variable_modeno sensitive capabilitysave_versionno sensitive capabilityscroll_into_viewno sensitive capabilityset_effectsno sensitive capabilityset_fillno sensitive capabilityset_image_fillno sensitive capabilityset_instance_propertiesno sensitive capabilityset_reactionsno sensitive capabilityset_text_propertiesno sensitive capabilityswap_componentno sensitive capabilityupdate_auto_layoutno sensitive capabilityupdate_variableno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (55 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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