Figma Slides (luan007) MCP Server
figma-slides-mcp
npm
v0.1.2
Published by luan007 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Figma Slides MCP — create and edit presentations with built-in D3, Rough.js, and Satori renderers for charts, diagrams, and custom graphics.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: render_satori → get_slide_context → batch_operations. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow render_satori → get_slide_context → batch_operations
high Tool "batch_operations" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "batch_operations" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "cmd"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool batch_operations
high Tool "render_d3" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "render_d3" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool render_d3
high Tool "render_rough" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "render_rough" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool render_rough
high Tool "render_satori" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "render_satori" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool render_satori
medium Unconstrained command parameter "cmd" on "batch_operations"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "batch_operations" takes a command-shaped parameter "cmd" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool batch_operations · inputSchema.properties.cmd
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "render_d3"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "render_d3" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool render_d3 · inputSchema.properties.script
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "render_rough"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "render_rough" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool render_rough · inputSchema.properties.script
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "render_satori"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "render_satori" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool render_satori · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "batch_operations" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "batch_operations" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool batch_operations
low Mutating tool "render_d3" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "render_d3" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool render_d3
low Mutating tool "render_rough" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "render_rough" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool render_rough
low Mutating tool "render_satori" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "render_satori" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool render_satori
Tools 58
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
render_satoriingests untrusted inputruns code / shellbatch_operationsruns code / shellget_slide_contextreads sensitive datarender_d3runs code / shellrender_roughruns code / shellclear_slideno sensitive capabilityclone_nodeno sensitive capabilityconnection_statusno sensitive capabilitycreate_gifno sensitive capabilitycreate_nodeno sensitive capability
Show 48 more tools ↓
create_shape_with_textno sensitive capabilitycreate_slideno sensitive capabilitycreate_slide_rowno sensitive capabilitycreate_svgno sensitive capabilitycreate_tableno sensitive capabilitycreate_videono sensitive capabilitydelete_nodeno sensitive capabilitydelete_slideno sensitive capabilitydelete_slide_rowno sensitive capabilitydelete_table_columnno sensitive capabilitydelete_table_rowno sensitive capabilityduplicate_slideno sensitive capabilityexport_nodeno sensitive capabilityfind_nodesno sensitive capabilityfocus_slideno sensitive capabilityget_cell_contentno sensitive capabilityget_editor_infono sensitive capabilityget_interactive_elementsno sensitive capabilityget_node_propertiesno sensitive capabilityget_node_treeno sensitive capabilityget_selectionno sensitive capabilityget_slide_gridno sensitive capabilityget_text_contentno sensitive capabilitygroup_nodesno sensitive capabilityinsert_table_columnno sensitive capabilityinsert_table_rowno sensitive capabilitylist_fontsno sensitive capabilitylist_themesno sensitive capabilitymove_slide_to_rowno sensitive capabilityplace_imageno sensitive capabilityreorder_slidesno sensitive capabilityreparent_nodeno sensitive capabilityreplace_mediano sensitive capabilityscreenshot_all_slidesno sensitive capabilityscreenshot_slideno sensitive capabilityset_cell_contentno sensitive capabilityset_propertiesno sensitive capabilityset_selectionno sensitive capabilityset_slide_skippedno sensitive capabilityset_slide_themeno sensitive capabilityset_slide_transitionno sensitive capabilityset_slides_view_modeno sensitive capabilityset_textno sensitive capabilityset_text_range_styleno sensitive capabilityset_viewportno sensitive capabilitystart_sessionno sensitive capabilityungroup_nodeno sensitive capabilityzoom_to_fitno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (58 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.2 latest |
B 89/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan figma-slides-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Figma Slides 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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