Fidacy MCP Server
@fidacy/mcp
npm
v0.20.3
Published by @fidacy — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Fidacy action firewall for AI agents. Mandate-gated payment authorization as an MCP server.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/hook-cli.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/hook-cli.js:1110`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: h|\.env|\.netrc|\.npmrc|id_rsa|id_ed25519|credentials|secrets?|token|keychain|\.pem|\.p12|kubeconfig)/i; function notave
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/hook-cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/connect.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/connect.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync as existsSync4, mkdtempSync, readFileSync as readFileSync4,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/connect.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1650`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync as existsSync5, mkdtempSync, readFileSync as readFileSync5,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@fidacy/mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node -e "try{require('fs').accessSync('dist/postinstall.js')}catch{process.exit(0)};import('./dist/postinstall.js')" || exit 0
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @fidacy/mcp
Tools 12
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
anchor_artifactno sensitive capabilityassess_actionno sensitive capabilitycheck_artifactno sensitive capabilityexplain_decisionno sensitive capabilityget_audit_proofno sensitive capabilitylist_decisionsno sensitive capabilityregister_emailno sensitive capabilityrequest_paymentno sensitive capabilitysentinel_alertsno sensitive capabilityspend_summaryno sensitive capability
Show 2 more tools ↓
upgradeno sensitive capabilityverify_mandateno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (12 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.20.3 latest |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.20.0 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v0.18.4 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v0.18.2 |
A 95/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.15.5 |
A 98/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.15.4 |
A 98/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v0.15.3 |
A 98/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v0.15.1 |
A 98/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
v0.15.0 |
A 98/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v0.13.0 |
A 98/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @fidacy/mcp --onlineMore in Data Science & ML
MCP server for 2s.io — 575+ pay-per-call tools for AI agents — ground-truth data, AI gateway, and agent infra (storage, locks, queues, watchers). x402 USDC on Base/Solana, no API keys, upto usage billing, free trials.
ArXiv preprints + Google Scholar papers, with citation counts in one query.
Add MCP servers to your favorite coding agents with a single command.
Help agents automatically write and test stories for your UI components
Model Context Protocol server for AI-Archive platform - enables AI agents to discover, submit, and review research papers
MCP server for Semantic Scholar research workflows with stdio and Streamable HTTP transports.