Ffmpeg Render Pro MCP Server
ffmpeg-render-pro
npm
v1.5.2
Source verified
Published by beeswaxpat — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Parallel video rendering with live dashboard, GPU auto-detection, checkpoint system, and stream-copy concat. Includes an MCP server, a Claude Code skill, and a CLI.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Tool "render_video" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "render_video" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool render_video
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/audio-merge.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/audio-merge.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const { ffmpegBin } = require('./ffmpeg-bin'); const STDERR_CAP = 8192; /**
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/audio-merge.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/color-grade.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/color-grade.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const { getEncoderIO } = require('./gpu-detect'); const { ffmpegBin } = require
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/color-grade.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/concat.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/concat.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } = require('child_process'); const fs = require('fs'); const os = require('os'); const path = require('path'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/concat.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/dashboard-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/dashboard-server.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const os = require('os'); const BIND_HOST = '127.0.0.1'; const MIME_TYPES = {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/dashboard-server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/encoder.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/encoder.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const { getCodecArgs } = require('./gpu-detect'); const { ffmpegBin } = require
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/encoder.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/gpu-detect.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/gpu-detect.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } = require('child_process'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); const os = require('os'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/gpu-detect.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/parallel-renderer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/core/parallel-renderer.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); const fs = require('fs'); const crypto = require(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/parallel-renderer.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "worker_script" on "render_video"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "render_video" takes a command-shaped parameter "worker_script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool render_video · inputSchema.properties.worker_script
low Mutating tool "render_video" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "render_video" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool render_video
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/basic-worker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/basic-worker.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const { width, height, fps, seed, startFrame, endFrame, segmentPath, wor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/basic-worker.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/starter-worker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/starter-worker.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const { width, height, fps, seed, startFrame, endFrame, segmentPath, wor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/starter-worker.js
Tools 7
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
render_videoruns code / shellcolor_gradeno sensitive capabilityconcat_videosno sensitive capabilitydetect_gpuno sensitive capabilityget_worker_templateno sensitive capabilitymerge_audiono sensitive capabilitysystem_infono sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (7 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.2 latest |
A 94/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
v1.5.1 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v1.5.0 |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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