Festo Codesys MCP Server
festo-codesys-mcp
npm
v1.0.1
Published by efranceschetti — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/services/codesys-interop.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/services/codesys-interop.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { writeFile, unlink } from 'fs/promises'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/services/codesys-interop.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/services/python-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/services/python-runner.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { join, resolve } from 'path'; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/services/python-runner.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([ide_browse_project_tree]) co-exist with external-action tools ([ide_open_project, ide_save_project, ide_browse_project_tree]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [ide_browse_project_tree] → sinks [ide_open_project, ide_save_project, ide_browse_project_tree]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow ide_browse_project_tree → ide_open_project
Tools 38
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ide_browse_project_treeingests untrusted inputnetwork egresside_open_projectnetwork egresside_save_projectnetwork egresscpx_discover_systemno sensitive capabilitycpx_read_channelno sensitive capabilitycpx_system_stateno sensitive capabilitycpx_write_channelno sensitive capabilitycreate_data_typeno sensitive capabilitycreate_function_blockno sensitive capabilitycreate_gvlno sensitive capability
Show 28 more tools ↓
create_programno sensitive capabilitycreate_project_structureno sensitive capabilitydebug_plc_codeno sensitive capabilityedcon_drive_controlno sensitive capabilityedcon_pnu_readno sensitive capabilityedcon_pnu_writeno sensitive capabilityedcon_position_taskno sensitive capabilityexplain_error_codeno sensitive capabilitygenerate_plcopen_xmlno sensitive capabilityide_compile_projectno sensitive capabilityide_create_methodno sensitive capabilityide_create_pouno sensitive capabilityide_create_projectno sensitive capabilityide_create_propertyno sensitive capabilityide_get_device_treeno sensitive capabilityide_get_pou_codeno sensitive capabilityide_patch_pou_codeno sensitive capabilityide_set_pou_codeno sensitive capabilityplc_knowledgeno sensitive capabilityplc_libraryno sensitive capabilityplc_lookupno sensitive capabilityplc_validateno sensitive capabilityreview_st_codeno sensitive capabilityst_find_referencesno sensitive capabilityst_symbolsno sensitive capabilityvalidate_plcopen_semanticno sensitive capabilityvalidate_plcopen_xmlno sensitive capabilityvalidate_plcopen_xsdno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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