Mnema MCP Server
@felipesauer/mnema
npm
v0.13.0-alpha.0
Source verified
Published by felipesauer — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
A tamper-evident, local-first audit trail for AI-agent work — an MCP server giving Claude Code, Cursor and other agents typed tools behind workflow gates, with every action recorded in a SHA-256 hash-chained log.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Tool "eval_report" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_report" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_report
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/serve-command.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/serve-command.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { createDashboardServer, DEFAULT_HOST, DEFAULT_PORT, isLoopbackHost, } fr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/serve-command.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/anchor/git-signed-anchor-provider.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/anchor/git-signed-anchor-provider.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; /** The registered name of the git-signed provider. */ export const GIT_SIGNED_P
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/anchor/git-signed-anchor-provider.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/domain-event-dispatcher.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/domain-event-dispatcher.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { DomainEvent } from '../domain/enums/domain-event.js'; /** * Default ti
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/domain-event-dispatcher.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/git-commit-service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/git-commit-service.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'; /** The real git runner (spawns an actual
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/git-commit-service.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/github-pr-service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/github-pr-service.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; export const defaultRunner = (command, args) => { const result = spawnSync(c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/github-pr-service.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/memory-staleness.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/memory-staleness.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; const defaultGitRunner = (args, cwd) => { const result = spawnSync('git', [.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/memory-staleness.js
low Mutating tool "eval_report" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_report" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_report
Tools 95
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
eval_reportruns code / shellagent_plan_createno sensitive capabilityagent_plan_update_stateno sensitive capabilityagent_plans_listno sensitive capabilityagent_run_endno sensitive capabilityagent_run_resumeno sensitive capabilityagent_run_showno sensitive capabilityagent_run_startno sensitive capabilityaudit_queryno sensitive capabilityaudit_verifyno sensitive capability
Show 85 more tools ↓
command_showno sensitive capabilitycommands_listno sensitive capabilitycontext_bootstrapno sensitive capabilitydecision_acceptno sensitive capabilitydecision_promote_from_noteno sensitive capabilitydecision_promote_from_observationno sensitive capabilitydecision_recordno sensitive capabilitydecision_rejectno sensitive capabilitydecision_showno sensitive capabilitydecision_supersedeno sensitive capabilitydecisions_impactingno sensitive capabilitydecisions_listno sensitive capabilitydrift_commitsno sensitive capabilityepic_add_taskno sensitive capabilityepic_closeno sensitive capabilityepic_coverageno sensitive capabilityepic_createno sensitive capabilityepic_deleteno sensitive capabilityepic_lintno sensitive capabilityepic_removeno sensitive capabilityepic_showno sensitive capabilityepic_updateno sensitive capabilityepics_listno sensitive capabilityevolve_reportno sensitive capabilityfile_collisionsno sensitive capabilityfocusno sensitive capabilitygraph_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityhistory_getno sensitive capabilitylabels_listno sensitive capabilitymemories_listno sensitive capabilitymemory_archiveno sensitive capabilitymemory_contradictno sensitive capabilitymemory_recordno sensitive capabilitymemory_showno sensitive capabilitymemory_supersedeno sensitive capabilitymetrics_flowno sensitive capabilitynote_addno sensitive capabilityobservation_archiveno sensitive capabilityobservation_recordno sensitive capabilityobservations_listno sensitive capabilitypr_statusno sensitive capabilityprovenanceno sensitive capabilityrun_diffno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilityskill_diffno sensitive capabilityskill_recordno sensitive capabilityskill_review_proposalsno sensitive capabilityskill_showno sensitive capabilityskill_suggestno sensitive capabilityskill_supersedeno sensitive capabilityskill_useno sensitive capabilityskills_listno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_generateno sensitive capabilitysprint_add_taskno sensitive capabilitysprint_add_tasksno sensitive capabilitysprint_cancelno sensitive capabilitysprint_closeno sensitive capabilitysprint_coverageno sensitive capabilitysprint_createno sensitive capabilitysprint_lintno sensitive capabilitysprint_metricno sensitive capabilitysprint_removeno sensitive capabilitysprint_showno sensitive capabilitysprint_startno sensitive capabilitysprints_listno sensitive capabilitytask_actionsno sensitive capabilitytask_assignno sensitive capabilitytask_attach_evidenceno sensitive capabilitytask_claimno sensitive capabilitytask_createno sensitive capabilitytask_create_manyno sensitive capabilitytask_dependenciesno sensitive capabilitytask_depends_manyno sensitive capabilitytask_depends_onno sensitive capabilitytask_evidenceno sensitive capabilitytask_labelsno sensitive capabilitytask_release_claimno sensitive capabilitytask_set_labelsno sensitive capabilitytask_showno sensitive capabilitytask_updateno sensitive capabilitytasks_listno sensitive capabilitytasks_queryno sensitive capabilitytasks_readyno sensitive capabilitywikilink_referencesno sensitive capabilitywikilinks_lintno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (95 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.13.0-alpha.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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