Feishu (cso1z) MCP Server
feishu-mcp
npm
v0.3.2
Published by cso1z — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol server for Feishu integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/auth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/auth.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { createServer as createNetServer } from 'net'; import express from 'expr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/auth.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/auth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/auth.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { createServer as createNetServer } from 'net'; import express from 'expr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands/auth.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/services/feishuAuthService.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/feishuAuthService.js:19`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await axios.get('https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/authen/v1/user_info', { headers: { Authorization: `B
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/feishuAuthService.js
Tools 21
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
batch_create_feishu_blocksno sensitive capabilitybatch_update_feishu_block_textno sensitive capabilitycreate_feishu_documentno sensitive capabilitycreate_feishu_folderno sensitive capabilitycreate_feishu_tableno sensitive capabilitycreate_feishu_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_feishu_document_blocksno sensitive capabilitydelete_feishu_taskno sensitive capabilityfill_whiteboard_with_plantumlno sensitive capabilityget_feishu_document_blocksno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
get_feishu_document_infono sensitive capabilityget_feishu_folder_filesno sensitive capabilityget_feishu_image_resourceno sensitive capabilityget_feishu_root_folder_infono sensitive capabilityget_feishu_usersno sensitive capabilityget_feishu_whiteboard_contentno sensitive capabilitylist_feishu_tasksno sensitive capabilitysearch_feishu_documentsno sensitive capabilityupdate_feishu_block_textno sensitive capabilityupdate_feishu_taskno sensitive capabilityupload_and_bind_image_to_blockno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan feishu-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Feishu 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
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