Fedramp 20x MCP Server
fedramp-20x-mcp
PyPI
v1.3.0
Published by kevinrabun — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for querying FedRAMP 20x requirements
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_frr_analyzers.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_frr_analyzers.py:224`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: blic_key = file("~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub") } os_disk { caching = "ReadWrite" storage_account_type
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_frr_analyzers.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_ced_patterns.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_ced_patterns.py:106`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: gs.get('code') result = eval(user_input)""" result = analyzer.analyze(code, "python")
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_ced_patterns.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/run_all_tests.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/run_all_tests.py:103`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: output result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "pytest", str(test_path), "-v", "--tb=short"]
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/run_all_tests.py
Tools 48
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
export_to_csvnetwork egressexport_to_excelnetwork egressadd_requirement_commentsno sensitive capabilityanalyze_all_frrsno sensitive capabilityanalyze_application_codeno sensitive capabilityanalyze_cicd_pipelineno sensitive capabilityanalyze_frr_codeno sensitive capabilityanalyze_frr_familyno sensitive capabilityanalyze_infrastructure_codeno sensitive capabilitycheck_package_vulnerabilitiesno sensitive capability
Show 38 more tools ↓
check_requirement_dependenciesno sensitive capabilitycompare_with_rev4no sensitive capabilityestimate_implementation_effortno sensitive capabilitygenerate_implementation_checklistno sensitive capabilitygenerate_implementation_questionsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ksi_specificationno sensitive capabilityget_cloud_native_guidanceno sensitive capabilityget_controlno sensitive capabilityget_definitionno sensitive capabilityget_documentation_fileno sensitive capabilityget_evidence_automation_architectureno sensitive capabilityget_evidence_collection_codeno sensitive capabilityget_frr_evidence_automationno sensitive capabilityget_frr_implementation_statusno sensitive capabilityget_frr_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_implementation_examplesno sensitive capabilityget_infrastructure_code_for_ksino sensitive capabilityget_ksino sensitive capabilityget_ksi_coverage_statusno sensitive capabilityget_ksi_coverage_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_ksi_evidence_artifactsno sensitive capabilityget_ksi_evidence_automationno sensitive capabilityget_ksi_evidence_queriesno sensitive capabilityget_ksi_family_statusno sensitive capabilityget_ksi_implementation_matrixno sensitive capabilityget_ksi_implementation_statusno sensitive capabilityget_ksi_implementation_summaryno sensitive capabilitylist_definitionsno sensitive capabilitylist_documentation_filesno sensitive capabilitylist_family_controlsno sensitive capabilitylist_frrs_by_familyno sensitive capabilitylist_ksino sensitive capabilityscan_dependency_fileno sensitive capabilitysearch_definitionsno sensitive capabilitysearch_documentationno sensitive capabilitysearch_requirementsno sensitive capabilityvalidate_architectureno sensitive capabilityvalidate_fedramp_configno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (48 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan fedramp-20x-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Security & Testing
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