Fathom Fyi MCP Server
fathom-fyi
npm
v4.6.6
Published by 0xhashy — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Financial Reality for AI Agents — The FYI your agent needs before it acts.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/auth/tier-check.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/tier-check.js:68`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch('https://fathom.fyi/api/verify', { headers: { 'x-fathom-key': apiKey },
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/tier-check.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/sources/defillama.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/sources/defillama.js:28`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch('https://api.llama.fi/summary/fees', { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sources/defillama.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/sources/weather.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/sources/weather.js:13`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://api.open-meteo.com/v1/forecast?latitude=${center.lat}&longitude=${center.lon}&cur
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sources/weather.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/rotate-api-key.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/rotate-api-key.js:14`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch('https://fathom.fyi/api/rotate-key', { method: 'POST', headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/rotate-api-key.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/worker/webhook-manager.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/worker/webhook-manager.js:11`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { await fetch('https://fathom.fyi/api/kv', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/worker/webhook-manager.js
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
set_webhooknetwork egressevaluate_strategyno sensitive capabilityget_account_statusno sensitive capabilityget_alertsno sensitive capabilityget_alternative_signalsno sensitive capabilityget_asset_contextno sensitive capabilityget_asset_momentumno sensitive capabilityget_chain_contextno sensitive capabilityget_correlation_matrixno sensitive capabilityget_crowd_intelligenceno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
get_defi_healthno sensitive capabilityget_derivatives_contextno sensitive capabilityget_event_catalyst_timelineno sensitive capabilityget_historical_contextno sensitive capabilityget_macro_contextno sensitive capabilityget_market_regimeno sensitive capabilityget_narrative_pulseno sensitive capabilityget_onchain_pulseno sensitive capabilityget_portfolio_analysisno sensitive capabilityget_question_contextno sensitive capabilityget_reality_checkno sensitive capabilityget_sentiment_stateno sensitive capabilityget_signal_historyno sensitive capabilityget_stablecoin_flowsno sensitive capabilityget_temporal_contextno sensitive capabilityget_watchlist_reportno sensitive capabilitymanage_webhooksno sensitive capabilityrotate_api_keyno sensitive capabilityset_alertno sensitive capabilityset_custom_strategyno sensitive capabilityset_portfolio_contextno sensitive capabilityset_signal_preferencesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.6.6 latest |
A 96/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan fathom-fyi --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
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