Fast Filesystem MCP Server
fast-filesystem-mcp
npm
v3.5.2
Published by efforthye — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Fast Filesystem MCP Server - Advanced file operations with Auto-Chunking, Sequential Reading, complex file operations (copy, move, delete, batch, compress), optimized for Claude Desktop
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t { exec, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Tool "fast_write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "fast_write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool fast_write_file
medium Tool "fast_large_write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "fast_large_write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool fast_large_write_file
medium Tool "fast_move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "fast_move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool fast_move_file
medium Tool "fast_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "fast_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool fast_delete_file
low Mutating tool "fast_write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "fast_write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool fast_write_file
low Mutating tool "fast_large_write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "fast_large_write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool fast_large_write_file
low Mutating tool "fast_move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "fast_move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool fast_move_file
low Mutating tool "fast_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "fast_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool fast_delete_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "fast_read_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "fast_read_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool fast_read_file · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "fast_write_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "fast_write_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool fast_write_file · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "fast_large_write_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "fast_large_write_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool fast_large_write_file · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "fast_delete_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "fast_delete_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool fast_delete_file · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 25
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fast_delete_filewrites filesfast_large_write_filewrites filesfast_move_filewrites filesfast_read_filereads sensitive datafast_write_filewrites filesfast_batch_file_operationsno sensitive capabilityfast_compress_filesno sensitive capabilityfast_copy_fileno sensitive capabilityfast_create_directoryno sensitive capabilityfast_edit_blockno sensitive capability
Show 15 more tools ↓
fast_edit_blocksno sensitive capabilityfast_edit_multiple_blocksno sensitive capabilityfast_extract_archiveno sensitive capabilityfast_extract_linesno sensitive capabilityfast_find_large_filesno sensitive capabilityfast_get_directory_treeno sensitive capabilityfast_get_disk_usageno sensitive capabilityfast_get_file_infono sensitive capabilityfast_list_allowed_directoriesno sensitive capabilityfast_list_directoryno sensitive capabilityfast_read_multiple_filesno sensitive capabilityfast_safe_editno sensitive capabilityfast_search_codeno sensitive capabilityfast_search_filesno sensitive capabilityfast_sync_directoriesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.5.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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