facturahub
npm
v1.10.0
Published by santy1422 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for invoicing, WooCommerce, expenses, POS, inventory, tasks, tax declarations, and business management. 69 AI tools for Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, and Windsurf. Freelancers, e-commerce, and startups.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 11 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:266`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: > __importStar(require('child_process'))); try { execSync('npm install -g facturahub@latest', { stdi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:291`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ' : 'xdg-open'; exec(`${openCmd} ${url}`); console.log(` ${bold('After signing up:')}`); consol
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
export_dataingests untrusted inputreads sensitive datadownload_pdfingests untrusted inputadd_movementno sensitive capabilityadjust_stockno sensitive capabilityassign_taskno sensitive capabilitychange_member_roleno sensitive capabilityclose_registerno sensitive capabilitycomplete_taskno sensitive capabilitycreate_catalog_itemno sensitive capabilitycreate_clientno sensitive capabilitycreate_invoiceno sensitive capabilitycreate_supplier_invoiceno sensitive capabilitycreate_taskno sensitive capabilitycreate_vendorno sensitive capabilitydelete_clientno sensitive capabilitydelete_expenseno sensitive capabilitydelete_invoiceno sensitive capabilitydelete_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_vendorno sensitive capabilityduplicate_invoiceno sensitive capabilitygenerate_tax_declarationno sensitive capabilityget_activity_logno sensitive capabilityget_aging_reportno sensitive capabilityget_billing_infono sensitive capabilityget_business_contextno sensitive capabilityget_cashflowno sensitive capabilityget_clientno sensitive capabilityget_contextno sensitive capabilityget_dashboard_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_expenseno sensitive capabilityget_income_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_invoiceno sensitive capabilityget_my_tasksno sensitive capabilityget_open_registerno sensitive capabilityget_profileno sensitive capabilityget_profit_lossno sensitive capabilityget_revenue_by_clientno sensitive capabilityget_supplier_invoiceno sensitive capabilityget_task_overviewno sensitive capabilityget_tax_declarationno sensitive capabilityget_tax_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_vat_balanceno sensitive capabilityinvite_team_memberno sensitive capabilitylist_catalog_itemsno sensitive capabilitylist_clientsno sensitive capabilitylist_expensesno sensitive capabilitylist_invoicesno sensitive capabilitylist_supplier_invoicesno sensitive capabilitylist_tasksno sensitive capabilitylist_tax_declarationsno sensitive capabilitylist_team_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_teamsno sensitive capabilitylist_vendorsno sensitive capabilitymark_paidno sensitive capabilitymove_taskno sensitive capabilityopen_registerno sensitive capabilityrecord_supplier_paymentno sensitive capabilityregister_expenseno sensitive capabilityremove_business_contextno sensitive capabilityremove_team_memberno sensitive capabilitysave_business_contextno sensitive capabilitysave_business_summaryno sensitive capabilitysend_invoiceno sensitive capabilitysend_reminderno sensitive capabilitysubmit_tax_declarationno sensitive capabilitysubmit_to_dgino sensitive capabilityupdate_catalog_itemno sensitive capabilityupdate_clientno sensitive capabilityupdate_expenseno sensitive capabilityupdate_invoiceno sensitive capabilityupdate_profileno sensitive capabilityupdate_taskno sensitive capabilityupdate_tax_declarationno sensitive capabilityupdate_vendorno sensitive capabilityupgrade_planno sensitive capabilityvalidate_invoice_panamano sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.10.0 latest |
B 83/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan facturahub --online
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
Signed verification attestations for agent decisions: business, price, freshness, claim checks.
Actual Budget MCP server exposing API functionality
MCP server for Actual Budget - query and manage your personal finances through Claude
The Adyen Model Context Protocol server allows you to integrate with Adyen APIs through LLMs function calling utilizing various Clients. It currently supports the following tools:
Trusted agent-commerce hub: discover, trust-check, and route x402 payments with failover.